Militarization of police: a comparison of police paramilitary units in Canadian and the United States

Abstract

In comparison with Canada, the more pronounced ability to acquire special weapons and tactics (SWAT) equipment in the United States suggests the resulting proliferation of SWAT teams with adequate material resources is likely to continue. This proliferation has stimulated media and public discourses against the “militarization” of police. In Canada, however, the amalgamation of SWAT teams has led to increased standardization in SWAT training, member specialization and protocols of applied practice. We argue that, in comparison with the United States, the proliferation of paramilitary activity is limited in the Canadian policing landscape by public safety governance structures, acquisition processes, and judicial scrutiny. In consequence, Canadian police services are better positioned than their counterparts in the United States to withstand the public scrutiny tied to police tactical responses.

An exploration of the use of tactical officers in three Canadian police services

“…Considering the limited attempts that have been made to gain an understanding of police officer perspectives regarding the use of tactical units (e.g., Phillips, 2018; Rojek, 2005), particularly within the Canadian context, this project has both practical and theoretical implications. For example, from a practical perspective, our findings contradict the assertion that the use of tactical officers in ‘routine’ calls for service and warrant executions are evidence of ‘failed public policy’ (Roziere and Walby, 2018: 46), but appear instead to be an attempt to optimize limited policing resources in order to meet the increasing demand of calls for service (e.g., Cyr et al ., 2020; den Heyer, 2014). In fact, the use of tactical officers may not only increase the safety for all parties involved, but also bolster limited policing resources during times of scarcity.…”

“…In fact, the use of tactical officers may not only increase the safety for all parties involved, but also bolster limited policing resources during times of scarcity. Taken together, the use of tactical team members during both calls beyond the capabilities of patrol to resolve optimally and calls lacking patrol resources appears to be a prudent utilization of these specialized officers (e.g., Cyr et al ., 2020; den Heyer, 2014). That being said, despite the value of tactical officers augmenting limited patrol resources, their primary mandate is still responding to critical incidents.…”

A Reasonable Officer: Examining the Relationships Among Stress, Training, and Performance in a Highly Realistic Lethal Force Scenario

“…While proper training may significantly improve performance, threat-induced performance deficits and lethal force errors in police officers are persistent, even with training ( Nieuwenhuys et al, 2015 ). For example, even the sample of highly trained tactical officers in this study had performance scores of 74, and 14% made lethal force errors under stressful conditions, despite a quarter of their shift time being devoted to training ( Cyr et al, 2020 ). These findings suggest that a reasonable officer, regardless of the amount of training and experience they have received, will likely not perform flawlessly under the unpredictable, novel, and potentially uncontrollable circumstances of a critical incident.…”

Rethinking Criminal Justice Education: Applying Experience Credits towards CJ Degree Completion – Generates Dollars, but Does It Make Sense?

“…To that end, there have been calls to entirely dismantle the existing paradigm of CJ education and replace it with one more focused on social justice that is more inclusive for both educators and students (Forstner, 2021). During the summer of 2020, people around the world saw the death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis patrol officers and the subsequent law enforcement response to the demonstrations that followed in cities across the country as the worst of the paramilitary style of policing (Cyr, Ricciardelli, & Spencer, 2020;Hill & Beger, 2009). How Black Lives Matter protesters were treated stood in direct opposition to how U.S. Capitol Police (and other responding agencies) approached supporters of former President Donald Trump who overran the Capitol complex on January 6 th, 2021.…”