Military Entrepreneurs: Patterns in Latin America

Abstract

Despite the recent shift to democratic regimes and market‐based economies, in many Latin American countries the military retains important economic roles as owner, manager, and stakeholder in economic enterprises. Such military entrepreneurship poses a challenge to the development of democratic civil‐military relations and, by extension, to the development of liberal democracy in the region. While scholars have noted this situation with concern, they have given little attention to distinguishing the different types of military entrepreneurship, which reflect distinct historical patterns and implications. This article identifies two major types of military entrepreneurs in Latin America: industrializers, determined to build national defense capabilities and compete for international prestige; and nation builders, seeking to promote economic development that can foster social development and cohesion. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador demonstrate important differences between these two types in their origins, paths, and political consequences.

Politically-Connected Firms and the Military-Clientelist Complex in North Africa

“…Given that the movement of a military into the distribution of rents seems to conflict with the essential nature of militaries, I define the institution under study as a military-clientelist complex: a broad penetration of the military into diverse economic sectors that has little to do with providing for defense needs, although military personnel may still use that rationalization in public. This phenomenon has been observed before in case studies of the military presence in regions as diverse as Latin America (Mani 2011), sub-Saharan Africa (Moyo 2016), central Asia (Golkar 2012), the Middle East and North Africa (Marshall and Stacher 2012) and east and southeast Asia (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003).…”

Bureaucratic Politicization, Partisan Attachments, and the Limits of Public Agency Legitimacy: The Venezuelan Armed Forces under Chavismo

“…In Latin America, low levels of effectiveness in realms beyond defense also lead to variation in public opinion of the military. This is especially true with regard to performance in social or national development, as in Ecuador and Cuba (Mani 2011b), but also to the economic performance and level of repression under military governments . For instance, military-civilian relations in Argentina and trust in the armed forces reached their nadir toward the end of the state-sponsored terrorism of the Dirty War and in the wake of the disastrous Falklands/Malvinas War under the NRP.…”

Military spending and entrepreneurship: Spatial effects of cross‐country spillovers

“…Military spending also has indirect spillovers in the form of knowledge spillovers from military technologies (see Azulay et al, ; Carlsson, Acs, Audretsch, & Braunerhjelm, ; Mani, ; Mazzucato, ; Taylor & Wilson, ). Such technologies breed entrepreneurship when information is unraveled to make new products or civilian uses are found for military products.…”

“…In some cases, however, national security considerations might bar foreign outsourcing of sensitive defense materials and weapons systems. In such instances, governments themselves get involved in production via military entrepreneurship (Mani, ). The national security limitations might also apply to domestic suppliers, with governments having greater leeway in monitoring domestic rather than foreign suppliers.…”