Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance

Abstract

Countries interested in the promotion of political development often provide aid in the form of democracy assistance. However, some regimes resist these attempts to promote democracy, introducing repressive measures to counteract their effectiveness. Hence, democracy assistance sometimes has the unintended consequence of curtailing democracy. This article explains how the size of the targeted regime’s military determines the effectiveness of democracy assistance and why it can sometimes result in lower levels of political freedom. Large militaries, often holding a privileged position in authoritarian regimes, will be threatened by political liberalization and its associated redistribution of resources. They will thus work with the regime to limit the effect of democracy assistance, while their size makes this repression more feasible. In states with smaller militaries, regimes have less incentive and capacity for repression, and democracy assistance is more successful at empowering democratic opposition. Cross-national statistical analysis of the United States Agency for International Development democracy assistance supports the argument.

The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding

“…Building on this conceptualization of backsliding as the erosion of one or more of these democratic institutions by elected officials, this chapter then develops (Berman, 2016;Hanley and Sikk, 2016;Hernandez and Kriesi, 2016;Krastev, 2016;Rupnik, 2016), no systematic theories of this phenomenon exist (Waldner and Lust, 2018). On the international side, authors have critiqued democracy assistance and suggested it can even have deleterious effects (Bush, 2015;Henderson, 2003;Savage, 2017;Wedel, 2001), while others have shown how regional powers may engage in autocracy promotion (Finkel and Brudny, 2012). However, few have investigated the role of IOs in particular and how they might be contributing to these illiberal trends.…”

“…However, there are a few important exceptions. Several authors have critiqued democracy assistance and suggested it can even have deleterious effects (Bush, 2015;Henderson, 2003;Savage, 2017;Wedel, 2001), while others have shown how regional powers may engage in autocracy promotion (Finkel and Brudny, 2012;Whitehead, 2015). Nevertheless, no studies have explicitly hypothesized or tested the extent to which international actors may unintentionally create conditions that make democratic backsliding more likely at the domestic level.…”

Ten Challenges in Democracy Support – and How to Overcome them

“…For example, the risk of backlash varies depending on the size of the military. Recent research shows that democracy promotion is more likely to trigger repression when recipients have larger armed forces (Savage, ). Democracy supporters therefore need to take account not only the danger of authoritarian backlash, but also the fact that this risk is likely to be higher in those countries in which the coercive capacity of the state is highest – compounding the challenge of difficult cases.…”

Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance?

“…16 Technical assistance focuses on improving election management and boosting administrative capacity, which can entail filling equipment gaps (purchasing ballot boxes, ballots, staining ink) and building institutional 13 See Carothers 1997, 112-115;and Burnell 2000, 29-30. 14 See Finkel et al 2007, Savun and Tirone 2011, Scott and Steele 2011, Dietrich and Wright 2015, Bush 2015, and Savage 2015 as the smallest USAID democratic governance category "elections and political processes," which includes observation, technical election assistance, and political party support. 15 See, e.g., Hyde 2011a, Kelley 2012 See Carothers 1999, 125-128;Bjornlund 2004, 60-62.…”