Military spending, fiscal capacity and the democracy puzzle

Rota, Mauro

doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2015.11.002

Cited by 18 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…However, empirical works have shown that the arms race model does not hold for the majority of cases (Oren, 1994;Rota, 2011). Therefore, this perspective has been replaced by the 'Security Web' concept (Rosh, 1988) and by the concept of an external enemy threat (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003a,b) and that of neighbors (Collier and Hoffler, 2004).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Rota (2011) finds that democracy and military spending were positively correlated before World War I and negatively correlated after World War I. Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström (2011) find that limited democracies are more war-oriented than autocracies.…”

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Rota (2011) states that the relationship between democracy and military spending, with regard to the "peace dividend," is complex, and references Spoalore (2005, 2006), who propose a model in which the peace dividend is not as large as might be expected due to the spread of democracy, since democracy can result in a higher number of nations, leading to more chances of regional conflict. Hess and Orphanides (2001) also find that democratization does not necessarily produce the so-called "peace dividend" and that wars may be just as prevalent under democratic regimes.…”

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Cohan (1975, 1976) and Schmitter (1971) distinguish between civilian and military regime types of regimes to find that military regimes spend more on the military. Russett and Oneal (2001) find that the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Latin America results in reduced military spending. Bove and Brauner (2011) examines differences in autocratic regimes, categorizing the regimes as Personalist, Single party, Monarchy and Military authoritarian regimes, and finds that military regimes have the highest levels of military spending.…”

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Military expenditures and political regimes: Evidence from global data, 1963–2000

2015

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Military Expenditures and Political Regimesmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Military expenditures and political regimes: Evidence from global data, 1963–2000

2015

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“…It is argued that democracy and high levels of political participation may shape decisions about peace and war. 33 Democracy and freedom may significantly decrease the military burden, yet the military burden may change according to the type of democratic administration and electoral system. 34 Bove and Brauner argue that even the type of dictatorship results in differences in demands for the military burden.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

MENA Bölgesinde Askeri Harcama Yüklerinin Yakınsaması

Yılancı¹,

Eryüzlü²,

Hopoğlu³

2020

Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi

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Military burdens in hostile environments may be high, as countries choose to spend on the military for deterrence purposes. In this study, we test whether the convergence hypothesis is valid for military burdens of a panel of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The results of the analysis suggest that there is unconditional β-convergence for the panel; however, individual convergence is valid for only Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. We also test whether the military burdens of Israel and the United States influence the military burdens of the countries in the panel. The results suggest that only the military burdens of Kuwait,

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Democracy’s third wave and national defense spending

Blum

2021

Public Choice

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I investigate how the third wave of democracy influenced national defense spending by using a panel of 110 countries for the period 1972-2013. I use new SIPRI data on military expenditure, which has been extended to years prior to 1988 and four democracy measures to address differences among democracy indices. The results from a dynamic panel data model suggest that democracy's third wave decreased defense spending relative to GDP by about 10% within countries that experienced democratization. This result does not show to be heterogeneous across world regions which the third wave reached in different sub-waves. I exploit the regional diffusion of democracy in the context of the third wave of democratizations as an instrumental variable (IV) for democracy in order to overcome endogeneity problems.The IV estimates indicate that democracy decreased national defense spending relative to GDP by about 20% within countries, demonstrating that OLS results underestimate the effect of democracy on national defense spending. The cumulative long-run effect of democratization resulting from the dynamics in defense spending is almost three times higher for both OLS and IV estimates.

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Military spending, fiscal capacity and the democracy puzzle

Cited by 18 publications

References 32 publications

Military expenditures and political regimes: Evidence from global data, 1963–2000

Military expenditures and political regimes: Evidence from global data, 1963–2000

MENA Bölgesinde Askeri Harcama Yüklerinin Yakınsaması

Democracy’s third wave and national defense spending

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