2017
DOI: 10.1017/s1744137416000527
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Mill ownership and farmer's cooperative behavior: the case of Costa Rica coffee farmers

Abstract: We analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer's behavior in an experimental public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point (cooperativevs.privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners (partners selling to the same type of mill or not). We find that cooperative farmers do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when playing with partners from the same type of mill. However, though farmers selling to private mills make no differe… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Public good games (n = 1): An observational study of coffee farmers in Costa Rica [26] finds that farmers from different communities contributed less to a public goods game than farmers from the same community and that free-riding behavior was correlated with actual free-riding behavior.…”
Section: Individual Incentives Influence Cooperative Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Public good games (n = 1): An observational study of coffee farmers in Costa Rica [26] finds that farmers from different communities contributed less to a public goods game than farmers from the same community and that free-riding behavior was correlated with actual free-riding behavior.…”
Section: Individual Incentives Influence Cooperative Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A study in Germany finds that a social nudge reduced farmers' freeriding in a simulation game [19]. Likewise, a study in Latin America finds that individual incentives were more effective than collective incentives in promoting Public good games (n = 1): An observational study of coffee farmers in Costa Rica [22] finds that farmers from different communities contributed less to a public goods game than farmers from the same community and that free-riding behavior was correlated with actual free-riding behavior.…”
Section: Individual Incentives Influence Cooperative Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The total contribution will be multiplied by a factor and split evenly among all players. PGG is a impor-tant and widespread representation of group interactions [1], it plays an important role in a wide range of clusters, including the management of rural public goods [2,3,4,5], the voluntary contribution of social public goods [6,7,8,9], and the supply of international public goods [10,11,12,13,14,15]. It is necessary to study the stable supply of public goods.…”
Section: Analysis Of the Game Processmentioning
confidence: 99%