2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2012.10.008
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Mimic: An active covert channel that evades regularity-based detection

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Cited by 22 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…The GPU will use the CCE calculation to report which flows are likely to contain covert channels. In our work, we consider a well-known CTC variety known as model-based covert timing channels (MBCTCs), which avoid detection by fitting the CTC's packet timings to a statistical model based on natural traffic [7]. By testing our tool against a traffic sample injected with MBCTCs, we confirm the CCE test's effectiveness as a classifier established in previous results [5].…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 64%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The GPU will use the CCE calculation to report which flows are likely to contain covert channels. In our work, we consider a well-known CTC variety known as model-based covert timing channels (MBCTCs), which avoid detection by fitting the CTC's packet timings to a statistical model based on natural traffic [7]. By testing our tool against a traffic sample injected with MBCTCs, we confirm the CCE test's effectiveness as a classifier established in previous results [5].…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 64%
“…Examples include the -similarity test (effective for detecting IPCTC traffic), and measuring the data and acknowledgement packet timing intervals (effective for detecting the Cloak CTC) [5]. After new detection techniques are introduced, new covert timing channel types designed to counter those techniques tend to follow [5], [7].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is always classified by the employed carrier; the most popular type of covert channels is network covert channels, which is based on network traffic; information is embedded by manipulating the packet timing information [1][2][3][4] or pudding some bits into the packet headers [5]. As the youngest branch of covert channels, wireless covert channel conceals the very existence of secret information by modulating it into the delivered wireless signal [6] or modifying some redundant fields of wireless communication protocols [7].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, such mechanisms are not applicable to the problem of linking flows studied in this paper. Particularly, a significant number of covert traffic timing mechanisms work by generating synthetic network flows-as opposed to modifying some existing flows-in order embed covert messages [1,6,15,23,27,28,39]. The synthetic traffic is generated in a way to mimic that of normal traffic.…”
Section: Relevance To Covert Communicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%