Mind the gap: How party–voter incongruence fuels the entry and support of new parties

Abstract

This article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual-level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party-voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesize that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Timeseries analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support.

Publicize or Perish—Challenger party success through megaphones and locomotives

“…The most robust finding here is that parties, in order to be successful, have to lay claim to a part of the salient issue space (e.g. Abedi, 2002;Krause, 2020;van de Wardt & Otjes, 2021;Wagner, 2021). In these studies, the units of analysis are typically elections (over time and/or across countries) and the dependent variable is the success of the national representative of a certain party type (populist, new, radical right, etc.).…”

“…We thus challenge the literature's focus on challenger parties’ messages and the widespread claim that closing a representational gap is the decisive step for a challenger to take (e.g. De Vries & Hobolt, 2020; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Meguid, 2008; van de Wardt & Otjes, 2021). The second neglected aspect of successful communication on which we focus is the importance of the prominence of party leaders.…”

“…New parties can emerge where there is programmatic space to occupy (Hillen & Steiner, 2020; Hino, 2012; Ignazi, 1992; van de Wardt & Otjes, 2021) and such exclusive fit between parts of the electorate and a challenger party helps the latter to survive in the long run (Adams et al., 2006; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015; Rochon, 1985). Thus, many challenger parties make programmatic offers not covered by other parties (van de Wardt et al., 2014), and this appears to help challenger parties thrive (e.g., Mauerer et al., 2015; Spoon & Klüver, 2019; Wagner, 2021), or at least helps voters already inclined to vote against the mainstream decide on a specific challenger (Bosch & Durán, 2019; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016).…”

The nuclear option: Voting for the pan-European party Volt

“…The electoral support for new parties has been subject to ample academic attention. In addition to elements of the political system, such as a proportional electoral system (Tavits, 2008), the interplay between political demand and supply plays an important role in generating electoral support for new parties (Van De Wardt and Otjes, 2022). The political opportunity structure is an important factor in the electoral success of new parties (Kitschelt, 1988; Rydgren, 2004; Nachtwey and Spier, 2007; Fell, 2006; Spies and Franzmann, 2011; Abedi, 2002; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).…”

“…One of the ways in which new parties develop is ‘branching’, where the impetus for organization comes from a transnational party that decides to organize itself in a new country (Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008). While there is an extensive literature on new party success (Van De Wardt and Otjes, 2022), we know little about whether this kind of branching strategy is electorally successful. By studying the success of one national Volt branch, we can get a grasp on this.…”