Mindreading Knowledge

Abstract

Is knowing a mental state in its own right, as believing is, or is it, at best, a mental state in an attenuated sense due to being a species of belief? Jennifer Nagel has recently contended that there is a strong empirical case for the former view of knowledge, arguing indirectly for this conclusion by drawing on work in developmental and comparative psychology that she takes to suggest that the concept of knowledge is acquired before the concept of belief. This chapter critically reassesses the bearing of the relevant empirical results and argues that they present a messy, complicated, and inherently inconclusive picture of when children and other creatures acquire the concepts in question. It concludes that the available empirical evidence does not support Nagel’s conceptual priority claim, let alone her further metaphysical conclusions about the nature of knowledge.

Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated

“…Other philosophers have recently objected to Nagel's proposal (see Butterfill, 2013; McGlynn, 2017; Rose, 2015; Rysiew, 2013). For instance, in a recent and insightful article, McGlynn (2017) proposes a number of considerations aimed at questioning the significance of the empirical data in Nagel's argument. His discussion centers on mindreading and most concretely on data from developmental psychology (as well as from comparative psychology).…”

“…These are not meant to constitute an exhaustive treatment of McGlynn's criticism, but rather to serve as pointers toward a fuller line of response to his objections that knowledge‐first sympathizers might explore. McGlynn (2017, sec. 2.1) observes that proponents of the knowledge‐first view have relied importantly on the work of Perner (1993) in particular in making suggestions about the priority of the concept of knowledge.…”

“…11 And taking this theory seriously seems to be in tension with the idea that we acquire the concept of “knowledge” before that of belief. According to McGlynn (2017, p. 79), “[a]ny argument for the priority of knowledge based on Perner's discussion will have to involve cherry‐picking conclusions.”…”

“…In particular, as potential alternatives McGlynn mentions the fully mentalistic approach, for example, Carruthers (2011) among others, and minimalist views, for example, Apperly (2011), Butterfill and Apperly (2013), and Ruffman (2014) among others. According to McGlynn, the oddity of Nagel's proposal (in Nagel, 2013) is that it entails “a relatively full‐blooded mentalistic interpretation of children's early success on tasks involving the attribution of knowledge or ignorance but a relatively minimalist explanation of their success on nonverbal false belief tasks” (McGlynn, 2017, p. 88). This apparent oddity, however, appears to be dealt with in a more recent publication by Jennifer Nagel (2017).…”

“…10 10 See, however, Rose (2015) and McGlynn (2017), for a challenge to the evidence from the empirical literature. See Dudley (2018) for discussion. …”