Minimal Anti-Humeanism

Bhogal, Harjit

doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1241289

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In contrast, primitivists tend to have little to say about what laws, considered as metaphysical entities, are like. Recently, Bhogal (2017) has offered a somewhat different version of primitivism, on which laws are taken to be universal generalizations that are primitively true. I find this account more perspicuous, but since the law-like generalizations are simply primitively true, we are still left in the dark as to why the worldly regularities hold, or rather why the propositions expressing those regularities are true.…”

Section: Natural Laws As Relations Between Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The laws of modality

Tugby

2022

Philos Stud

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Nomic realists have traditionally put laws to work within a theory of natural modality, in order to provide a metaphysical source for causal necessitation, counterfactuals, and dispositions. However, laws are well-suited to perform other work as well. Necessitation is a widespread phenomenon and includes (for example) cases of categorial, conceptual, grounding, mathematical and normative necessitation. A permissive theory of universals allows us to extend nomic realism into these other domains. With a particular focus on grounding necessitation, it is argued that the sorts of reasons for positing laws in the natural causal domain also apply in other domains. Laws might well be the source of all first-order modality.

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Section: Natural Laws As Relations Between Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The laws of modality

Tugby

2022

Philos Stud

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“…Whether this really counts as a Humean view gets at some much bigger questions about how to formulate metaphysical theses, and, in particular, whether modality is the right tool in formulating them. (See Bhogal (2017, sec. 4) for a discussion of different ways to formulate Humeanism).…”

Section: The Case Against Humeanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Humeanism about laws of nature

Bhogal

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Humeanism about laws of nature is, roughly, the view that the laws of nature are just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events. In this paper, I survey some of the (many!) objections that have been raised to Humeanism, considering how the Humean might respond. And I consider how we might make a positive case for Humeanism. The common thread running through all this is that the viability of the Humean view relies on the Humean having an importantly different conception of explanation to the anti‐Humean.

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“…And indeed this seems to dovetail with some bits of the literature on humeanism. See, e.g., Lange (2013), Miller (2015), Bhogal (2017). Shumener (2017) clearly distinguishes between the metaphysical and semantic senses of determination at play for the humean, but also provides a powerful challenge to the idea that the circularity charge often leveled against humeans could be resolved by appeal to that distinction.)…”

Section: Lem and Two Kinds Of Semantic Determinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics

McSweeney¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground.

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Minimal Anti-Humeanism

Cited by 19 publications

References 26 publications

The laws of modality

The laws of modality

Humeanism about laws of nature

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics

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