Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense

Tenenbaum, Sergio

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2014.894275

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…For related principles, see . 5 For other pieces of the puzzle, see Tenenbaum & Raffman (2012), Tenenbaum (2010), Tenenbaum (2014), and Tenenbaum (2015). 6 I look at other norms in Tenenbaum (2014).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 For other pieces of the puzzle, see Tenenbaum & Raffman (2012), Tenenbaum (2010), Tenenbaum (2014), and Tenenbaum (2015). 6 I look at other norms in Tenenbaum (2014). 7 This assumption is not strictly necessary for my argument; all we need to assume is that the intention is based on reasons.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For other pieces of the puzzle, see Tenenbaum & Raffman (), Tenenbaum (), Tenenbaum (), and Tenenbaum ().…”

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confidence: 99%

“…I think they are equally problematic, but I cannot discuss them here. See Tenenbaum () for discussion of these requirements.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Once we apply principles of coherence governing beliefs to beliefs that are formed in forming FDIs (such as the belief that I will ϕ that typically results from forming an intention to ϕ), and transmission principles governing normative reasons, we might capture all that a principle of means‐end coherence would capture when applied to FDIs. However, I cannot go into this issue in detail here (but see Tenenbaum ()). For reasons that will be clear below, I do not think we could dispense with a principle of instrumental reasoning that applies to ends that are currently being pursued .…”

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confidence: 99%

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Reconsidering Intentions

Tenenbaum

2016

Nous

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This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For other pieces of the puzzle, see Tenenbaum & Raffman (), Tenenbaum (), Tenenbaum (), and Tenenbaum ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I think they are equally problematic, but I cannot discuss them here. See Tenenbaum () for discussion of these requirements.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reconsidering Intentions

Tenenbaum

2016

Nous

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In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention

Rudy‐Hiller

2020

Synthese

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The Myth of a State of Intending

Russell

2020

Dialogue

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Recent work by Joseph Raz, Niko Kolodny, and Sergio Tenenbaum suggest that there are no normative constraints peculiar to intentions as such. Such constraints are a myth. We can understand the rationality of intention without positing that intention is a mental state. I argue that, further, we can understand the descriptive nature of intention (i.e., its role in intrapersonal coordination) without positing that intention is a mental state. Such a posit is itself a myth. Instead, intention is an action with certain characteristic sub-actions that play a coordinating role.

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Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense

Cited by 7 publications

References 22 publications

Reconsidering Intentions

Reconsidering Intentions

In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention

The Myth of a State of Intending

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