2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2013.07.004
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Minimum capital requirements, bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

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Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…This is particularly important when banks have different incentives to become interconnected and the regulator faces an informational disadvantage. Finally, the paper is also close to the literature on the effects of capital requirements under asymmetric information (e.g., VanHoose 2007 and references therein, Blum 2008, Vollmer andWiese 2013) and incentive based regulation (e.g., Campbell et al 1992, Giammarino et al 1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 63%
“…This is particularly important when banks have different incentives to become interconnected and the regulator faces an informational disadvantage. Finally, the paper is also close to the literature on the effects of capital requirements under asymmetric information (e.g., VanHoose 2007 and references therein, Blum 2008, Vollmer andWiese 2013) and incentive based regulation (e.g., Campbell et al 1992, Giammarino et al 1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 63%
“…The study investigates the effect of risk-based capital and traditional non-risk based capital on the bank risk and performance of Bangladesh. For this purpose, the study uses two simultaneous equations by following the previous literature (Zheng et al, 2017;Tan and Floros, 2013;Vollmer and Wiese, 2013;Francis and Osborne, 2012;Fiordelisi et al, 2011;Ben Naceur and Kandil, 2009;Altunbas et al, 2007;Nier and Baumann, 2006;Lee and Hsieh, 2013;Hussain and Hassan, 2005;Ayuso et al, 2004;Jacques and Nigro, 1997) as follows: Panel C: Bank-year observations Bank-year observations consideration for the study: 30 banks  16 years (2000-2015) 480 bank-years Less: bank-year observations without available information 67 bank-years Final total bank-year observations under the study 413 bank-years…”
Section: Empirical Models and Specification Of Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Currently, there is an ongoing international policy debate vis-à-vis how capital affects bank risks. The proponents of this view, such as the Basel Committee, argue that capital-based measures are crucial for bank risk mitigation (International Monetary Fund, 2010) from both macro-prudential (de Souza, 2016; Karmakar, 2016; Meeks, 2017) and micro-prudential point of views (Blahova, 2015; Vollmer and Wiese, 2013). Nevertheless, some studies find only limited evidence regarding the role of bank capital as an indicator for bank failure (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%