2011
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7
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Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

Abstract: This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player's decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.

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