Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

Weikard, Hans‐Peter; Wangler, Leo; Freytag, Andreas

doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9861-1

Cited by 29 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…2 2 This procedure is similar to the formulation of a minimum participation rule for an international environmental agreement in Weikard et al (2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

Marine Protected Areas in the High Seas and Their Impact on International Fishing Agreements

Punt¹,

Weikard²,

Ierland³

2012

Natural Resource Modeling

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Marine protected areas (MPAs) are gaining momentum as tools within fisheries management. Although many studies have been conducted to their use and potential, only few authors have considered their use in the High Seas. In this paper, we investigate the effects of fish growth enhancing MPAs on the formation of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) for highly migratory fish stocks. We argue that in absence of enforcement MPAs constitute a weakest‐link public good, which can only be realized if everyone agrees. We combine this notion with a game theoretic model of RFMO formation to derive potentially stable RFMOs with and without MPAs. We find that MPAs generally increase the parameter range over which RFMOs are stable, and that they increase stability in a number of cases as compared to the case without MPAs. They do not necessarily induce a fully cooperative solution among all fishing nations. In summary, results of this paper suggest a positive role for MPAs in the High Seas.

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“…2 2 This procedure is similar to the formulation of a minimum participation rule for an international environmental agreement in Weikard et al (2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

Marine Protected Areas in the High Seas and Their Impact on International Fishing Agreements

Punt¹,

Weikard²,

Ierland³

2012

Natural Resource Modeling

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“…The predictions of these models are rather pessimistic: Because of strong free-riding incentives, any self-enforcing IEA will be signed only by a small number of countries. Theoretical extensions to the coalition formation literature to address the free-riding problem include among others preferences for equity (e.g., Lange and Vogt 2003), a partial or modest internalization of joint benefits of the coalition members (Finus and Maus 2008) or a minimum participation threshold that has to be met until an agreement enters into force (Rutz 2001, Carraro et al 2009, Weikard et al 2012. Black et al (1993) are among the first who analyze the effect of an exogenously determined MPRs on cooperation.…”

Section: Minimum Participation Rules In International Environmental Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reasonable concerns however remain that a specific MPR exists that beats every other alternative in a pairwise vote after the heterogeneity among negotiating agents has been realized and thus prevents the political equilibrium. In a related study, Weikard et al (2012) consider a minimum participation stage with simultaneous ratification in a setting where players differ with respect to their costs and benefits. In a first stage, a randomly chosen country proposes a minimum abatement threshold that has to be accepted by unanimity voting.…”

Section: Minimum Participation Rules In International Environmental Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent theroretical contributions to this literature (Black et al 1993, Rutz 2001, Harstad 2006, Carraro et al 2009, Weikard et al 2012) and experimental investigations (e.g., Kosfeld et al 2009, Gerber et al 2013, McEvoy et al 2014) suggest minimum participation rules (MPRs) to hamper free-riding incentives and to facilitate cooperation at the extensive margin. A corresponding minimum participation clause ensures that a treaty only enters into force if a certain threshold such as a minimum number of ratifying countries is met.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements: empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations

Kesternich

2015

Applied Economics

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Minimum Participation Rules in International Environmental Agreements: Empirical Evidence from a Survey among Delegates in International Climate Negotiations Martin KesternichVersion: February 5, 2015 Abstract:Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a dataset from a world-wide survey among delegates in international climate negotiations, this paper assesses preferences for different MPRs for a future climate treaty among key players. The empirical findings provide evidence that small countries with low bargaining power rather opt for large minimum membership requirements while industrialized countries push forward the idea of a small carbon club of the largest emitters only. In contrast, delegates from countries in transition try to keep emission thresholds rather low which would allow a future agreement to come into force without their signature.

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“…Pintassilgo et al focus on non-cooperative game-theoretic coalition approaches but also consider some other approaches which have been relevant in this literature. Weikard et al (2015) analyse the effect of minimum participation rules (MPRs) on the effectiveness of IEAs. They generalize the model of Carraro et al (2009) to heterogeneous countries and assume that the MPR is specified in terms of non-cooperative abatement levels.…”

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confidence: 99%