Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Altman, Eitan; Reiffers, Alexandre; Menasché, Daniel Sadoc; Datar, Mandar; Dhamal, Swapnil; Touati, Corinne

doi:10.1145/3308897.3308950

Cited by 14 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…However, how to achieve a desired equilibrium is not discussed. Similar conclusion is reached in [136]. By leveraging a congestion game model [137], the authors prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria at which users decide whether to mine or not join the blockchain system.…”

Section: ) Crypto-currency Valuesupporting

confidence: 58%

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

et al. 2019

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Over the past decade, blockchain technology has attracted tremendous attention from both academia and industry. The popularity of blockchains was originated from the concept of crypto-currencies to serve as a decentralized and tamper-proof transaction data ledger. Nowadays, blockchains as the key framework in the decentralized public data-ledger have been applied to a wide range of scenarios far beyond crypto-currencies, such as the Internet of Things, healthcare, and insurance. This survey aims to fill the gap between a large number of studies on blockchain networks, where game theory emerges as an analytical tool, and the lack of a comprehensive survey on the game theoretical approaches applied in blockchain-related issues. In this survey, we review the game models proposed to address common issues in the blockchain network. The focus is placed on security issues, e.g., selfish mining, majority attack and denial of service attack, issues regarding mining management, e.g., computational power allocation, reward allocation, and pool selection, as well as issues regarding blockchain economic and energy trading. Additionally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these selected game theoretical models and solutions. Finally, we highlight important challenges and future research directions of applying game theoretical approaches to incentive mechanism design and the combination of blockchain with other technologies.INDEX TERMS Blockchain, game theory, mining management, security.The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Junggab Son. recently applied in a wide range of scenarios far beyond crypto-currencies, such as Internet of Things (IoT) [6], healthcare [7] and insurance [8]. In general, blockchain is a distributed public data-ledger maintained by achieving the consensus among a number of nodes in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. More specifically, the verified transaction data is stored in a chain of blocks, i.e., a basic data structure of blockchain, and the chain grows in an append-only manner with all new verified blocks to it. This process involves several operations such as verifying transactions, disseminating blocks, and attaching blocks to the blockchain.As such, the blockchain requires a number of consensus nodes to participate in the network. The rational nodes perform actions or strategies that aim to maximize their

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Section: ) Crypto-currency Valuesupporting

confidence: 58%

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

et al. 2019

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“…by CAPES and CNPq. This paper extends our conference version of the paper which appeared in Altman et al (2018). In particular, section 7 is novel as well as the background discussion on mining competition, accounting for dynamic puzzle complexity (section 2).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 74%

Blockchain Competition Between Miners: A Game Theoretic Perspective

et al. 2020

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We model the competition over mining resources and over several cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Leveraging results about congestion games, we establish conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria. We account for multiple system models, varying according to the way that mining resources are allocated and shared and according to the granularity at which mining puzzle complexity is adjusted. When constraints on resources are included, the resulting game is a constrained resource allocation game for which we characterize a normalized Nash equilibrium. Under the proposed models, we provide structural properties of the corresponding types of equilibrium, e.g., establishing conditions under which at most two mining infrastructures will be active or under which no miners will have incentives to mine a given cryptocurrency.

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“…For example, in an electricity market, there are coupling constraints due to the underlying power flow equations. Similar constraints exist in a transportation or telecommunication networks and general deregulated economy problems [1,2]. In this paper we focus on such class of noncooperative games, known as generalized Nash games or generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP).…”

Section: Context Of the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…All these refinement concepts lead to focus on subsets of the set of GNEs. For example, it is well known in the literature that the set of VEs is a subset of the set of GNEs [26,1,29]. Potential game formulation can be interpreted as another refinement of the GNE [30]; also focusing on only a subset of the GNEs.…”

Section: Context Of the Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parametrized Inexact-ADMM based coordination games: A normalized Nash equilibrium approach

Cadre

Mou

Höschle

2022

European Journal of Operational Research

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Generalized Nash equilibrium problems are single-shot Nash equilibrium problems, whereby the decisions of all agents are coupled through a shared constraint. Such games are generally challenging to solve as they might give rise to a very large number of solutions. In this context, spanning many equilibria can be interesting to provide meaningful interpretations. In the literature, to compute equilibria, equilibrium problems are classically reformulated as optimization problems, potential games, relaxed and extended games. Applications of these reformulations to an economic dispatch problem under perfect and imperfect competition are provided. Unfortunately, these approaches only enable to describe a very limited part of the equilibrium set. To fill that gap, relying on normalized Nash equilibrium as solution concept, we provide a parametrized decomposition algorithm inspired by the Inexact-ADMM to span many more equilibrium points. Complexifying the setting, we consider an information structure in which the agents can withhold some local information from sensitive data, resulting in private coupling constraints. The convergence of the algorithm and deviations in the players' strategies at equilibrium are formally analyzed. In addition, the algorithm can be used to coordinate the agents on one specific equilibrium with desirable properties at the system level. The coordination game is formulated as a principal-agent problem, and a procedure is detailed to compute the equilibrium that minimizes a secondary cost function capturing systemlevel properties. Finally, the Inexact-ADMM is applied to a cellular resource allocation problem, exhibiting better convergence rate than vanilla ADMM, and to compute equilibria that achieve both system-level efficiency and maximum fairness.

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Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

A Survey on Blockchain: A Game Theoretical Perspective

Blockchain Competition Between Miners: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Parametrized Inexact-ADMM based coordination games: A normalized Nash equilibrium approach

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