Ministerial Advisers, Politicization and the Retreat From Westminster: The Case of New Zealand

Abstract

Political advisers are an established third element in a number of Westminster‐styled jurisdictions, as they are in New Zealand’s institution of executive government. In this paper we report the initial findings of a research project focusing on the role and accountabilities of ministerial advisers in New Zealand. We locate these findings in the context of a growing body of international and comparative research on the role and accountabilities of non civil‐ or public‐service advisers within political executives and comment on the extent to which the findings affirm or refute the view that the ‘third element’ constitutes a threat to the continued application of Westminster principles and practices in New Zealand’s system of government – once described as more Westminster than Westminster. In doing so, we highlight deficiencies in standard conceptions of politicization and argue that there is a need to more clearly differentiate between its procedural and substantive dimensions.

‘Glorified Gofers, Policy Experts or Good Generalists’: A Classification of the Roles of the Irish Ministerial Adviser

“…Over time ministerial advisers have become an embedded, arguably legitimate, but controversial part of public life. A large proportion of the literature in this area is dedicated to the effect politically appointed advisers have on politico-administrative relations and consequences for accountability (Wicks, 2003;Fawcett & Gay, 2005;Connaughton, 2006;Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007a;Tiernan, 2007) though a more detailed focus is beginning to emerge internationally on the impact and roles these actors have in the policy-making process (Maley, 2000b;Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007b, 2010. The academic literature presents arguments that portray ministerial advisers as constituting both a threat and an opportunity for the pursuit of effective government.…”

Who takes the hit? Ministerial advisers and the distribution of welfare state cuts

“…In the first case vital state officials should be more loyal to the government, while in the latter case they should be more loyal to the state (Dierickx 2004;Grönngård Christensen 2004). What is more, several observers have noted a trend towards a more politicized political core both in cross country comparisons (Matheson et al 2007;Peters and Pierre 2004) and in specific countries such as the United States (Lewis 2008), New Zealand (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007) and Sweden (Dahlström and Pierre, forthcoming). , 1985-2002 This section shows an empirical test of the effects of the terms of employment of key bureaucrats on the distribution of welfare state cuts.…”

Revisiting the Gospel: Appointed Political Staffs and Core Executive Policy Coordination

“…These are often presented either in terms of political staffs' utility as a mechanism to secure public service responsiveness, or in the extreme, as a cause of public service politicization (Connaughton, 2010;Craft & Howlett, 2013;Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007a, 2007bLSE GV314 Group, 2012;Maley, 2000). A cursory review of official government documents from Westminster jurisdictions supports content-based distinctions along such lines.…”