Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who is deontological? Completing moral dilemmas in front of mirrors increases deontological but not utilitarian response tendencies

Using the CNI Model to Investigate Individual Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments

“…Consistent with previous research (Glenn et al, 2010; Reynolds et al, 2019; cf. Conway & Gawronski, 2013), we found a significant negative correlation between moral identity internalization and preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments in all four studies.…”

(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions

“…In addition, we manipulated whether participants responded to the regret measures while imagining themselves in public or in private to examine whether impression management concerns may moderate affective and cognitive regret. Past work suggests that lay people evaluate dilemma decision-makers who reject outcome-maximizing harm as warmer, more moral, and more trustworthy—but less competent and leader-like—than decision-makers who accept outcome-maximizing harm (e.g., Everett et al, 2016; Rom et al, 2017; Sacco et al, 2017); thus, the (real or implied) presence of others can influence dilemma responding (Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Lucas & Livingston, 2014; Reynolds et al, 2019), as people strategically self-present in dilemma contexts by shifting responses to align with perceived expectations (Rom & Conway, 2018). Moreover, people report thoughts and feelings that can enhance positive perceptions and mitigate negative perceptions of their judgments, such as acknowledging negative emotions when causing harm or reporting moral reasoning to buttress their decisions (Liu & Ditto, 2013; Rom et al, 2017).…”

Effects of Instrumentality and Personal Force on Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Harm-Related Moral Dilemmas

“…For example, Lee and Gino (2015) found that the instruction to suppress one's emotional reactions to moral dilemmas decreased deontological but not utilitarian inclinations; and Reynolds and Conway (2018) found that (a) manipulating the aversiveness of the harmful action increased deontological inclinations but decreased utilitarian inclinations, whereas (b) manipulating the aversiveness of the outcome increased both inclinations (see also Christov-Moore et al, 2017, for a related brain-imaging study). Other PD work has helped to clarify how moral judgments are influenced by social considerations (Rom and Conway, 2018), feelings of power (Fleischmann et al, 2019), self-awareness (Reynolds et al, 2019), distrust (Conway et al, 2018b), analytical thinking style (Li et al, 2018), gender (Friesdorf et al, 2015;Armstrong et al, 2019), and the presentation of moral dilemmas in a foreign language (Hayakawa et al, 2017;Muda et al, 2018).…”