MISSION AWARE: Evidence-Based, Mission-Centric Cybersecurity Analysis

Abstract

Currently, perimeter-based approaches are the mainstay of cybersecurity. While this paradigm is necessary, there is mounting evidence of its insufficiency with respect to sophisticated and coordinated attacks. In contrast to perimeterbased security, mission-centric cybersecurity provides awareness of how attacks can influence mission success and therefore focuses resources for mitigating vulnerabilities and protecting critical assets. This is strategic as opposed to tactical perimeter-based cybersecurity. We propose MISSION AWARE, which assists in the identification of parts of a system that destabilize the overall mission of the system if compromised. MISSION AWARE starts with a structured elicitation process that leads to hazards analysis. It employs hierarchical modeling methods to capture mission requirements, admissible functional behaviors, and system architectures. It then generates evidence-attacks applicable to elements that directly correlate with mission success. Finally, MISSION AWARE traces evidence back to mission requirements to determine the evidence with the highest impact relative to mission objectives. I. INTRODUCTIONHigh integrity Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) often integrate a diverse set of hardware and software components to provide critical service capabilities. These components include advanced computing platforms, sensors, control systems and communication networks to monitor operation conditions and control system assets as required for their underlying mission. Examples of their every day but include energy operation centers, wearable devices, connected automobiles, defense and military coordinated operations and homeland security monitoring centers, to name a few. The critical nature of these systems requires thorough, effective, and affordable security analysis throughout their lifecycle but especially at the early concept development phase. This is supported by the defense community where it is estimated that 70-80% of the decisions affecting safety and security are made in the early concept development phase of any project [1], [2]. Based on the above insights, we identify two distinct needs in the area of CPS security: (i) the need to derive resilience from both a system's and a mission context and (ii) the need to establish systematic risk-based security analysis early in a systems lifecycle that goes beyond security compliance checklists.The above needs are illustrated by recent reports on vulnerabilities in systems that are not just critical to infrastructure but

Enhancing Early Systems R&D Capabilities with Systems —Theoretic Process Analysis

“…al. 2016), automotive (Placke Duo 2015), port security (Williams 2015), and cyber security (Bakirtzis, et. al.…”

STPA-driven Multilevel Runtime Monitoring for In-time Hazard Detection

“…Design assurance of safety and security carry to the runtime domain, creating a shared responsibility for reducing the risk during deployment. These emerging methods include dynamic safety management [23], DepDevOps (dependable development operations continuum) [3], systematic safety and security assessment processes such as STPA (system theoretic process analysis) and STAMP (systems-theoretic accident model and processes), and MissionAware [2].…”

“…(1) what to monitor, (2) where to monitor, and (3) context of the monitoring. Our work addresses the gap between safety analysis and runtime monitor formulation.…”