Mistrust and Misinformation: A Two-Component, Socio-Epistemic Model of Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Pierre, Joseph

doi:10.31234/osf.io/xhw52

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 43 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…Nevertheless, there remains a significant minority who do not express a definite intention to take a COVID‐19 vaccine if it is offered to them. It is useful to distinguish two groups within this minority (e.g., Pierre, 2020 ). On the one hand, there are those who are extremely hesitant, vulnerable to conspiracy theories, and who may fall into the category of ‘anti‐vaxxers’.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficacy information influences intention to take COVID‐19 vaccine

Davis

Golding²,

McKay

2021

British J Health Psychol

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Objectives. A successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic requires achieving high levels of vaccine uptake. We tested whether directly contrasting the high efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines with the lower efficacy of the annual flu vaccine would increase intentions to take a COVID-19 vaccine. Design.A pre-registered online study of 481 participants compared four information conditions: (1) no information; (2) COVID-19 Vaccine Information Only; and COVID-19 Vaccine Information combined with flu vaccine information suggesting either (3) 60% efficacy or (4) 40% efficacy; we measured COVID-19 and flu vaccine intentions along with several other vaccine-related variables.Methods. The Prolific platform was used to recruit 481 UK participants (64% female; aged between 18 and 85 years) who had been pre-screened to have intermediate levels of vaccine hesitancy. After reading a short text (~200 words) about COVID-19 vaccines, participants were asked about their vaccination intentions.Results. Providing information about the safety and efficacy of the new COVID-19 vaccines resulted in vaccination intentions that were, on average, 0.39 standard deviations (SDs) higher than those in the no information condition; providing the same COVID vaccine efficacy information in the context of information about flu vaccine efficacy resulted in a further significant increase in vaccination intentions that were 0.68 SD higher than those in the no information condition. This positive contrast effect for the COVID-19 vaccine was not associated with reduced flu vaccine intentions.Conclusions. Vaccination intentions can be strengthened through a simple messaging intervention that utilizes context effects to increase perceived response efficacy. Statement of ContributionWhat is already known on this subject?Very high levels of COVID-19 vaccine uptake are required to attain herd immunity. Previous experience and recent surveys suggest that achieving such high levels of uptake will be challenging.Protection motivation theory predicts that high uptake requires both high threat appraisal and high coping appraisal. An important aspect of coping appraisal is response efficacy.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficacy information influences intention to take COVID‐19 vaccine

Davis

Golding²,

McKay

2021

British J Health Psychol

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“…They are present in those who do not believe in conspiracy theories and some of them, like need for uniqueness or closure, may be valued or adaptive in certain culturally-mediated settings. (Pierre, 2020, p. 618, see Douglas et al, 2019 for a review of the literature on the genesis of conspiratorial beliefs. )…”

Section: Epistemic Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Noordhof

Sullivan-Bissett

2021

Synthese

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Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothematic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present.

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“…Corrections may backfire in that retraction of misinformation could strengthen the belief of misinformation (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012), and fact checks are likely used to serve confirmation bias (Hameleers & van der Meer, 2020). Most importantly, research from outside of LIS also has started to develop a non‐individualistic model for understanding problematic information (Pierre, 2020). All of these questions and observations point toward the need for an alternative view for conceptualizing problematic information.…”

Section: Related Work: the Individualistic Lens Of Seeing Problematic Information As The Opposite Of Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding information: Adding a non‐individualistic lens

2020

Asso for Info Science & Tech

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The individualistic lens refers to the understanding of problematic information as something that is clearly identifiable, with objective criteria of measurement. This article argues for adding a non‐individualistic lens for understanding information. The necessity for adding a non‐individualistic lens grows from that the existing individualistic lens appears inadequate to make sense of information phenomenon, in particular when it comes to understanding problematic information. Non‐individualistic is proposed as a complementary perspective, which needs to be further developed conceptually. To begin such development, this article directs information professionals' attention to the promising concept of information ecology. More specifically, this article pulls resources from philosophy of information (Floridi's infosphere) and information ethics (Capurro's Angeletics) to illustrate existing conceptualizations of information ecology. Information ecology appears to align with this sociotechnical view that information researchers have started to develop in the most recent years, though arguably information ecology may have an even broader scope. Lastly, this article also points out that the conceptualization of information ecology needs to be aware of, and cautious of the philosophical assumption that is relied on for understanding information.

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Mistrust and Misinformation: A Two-Component, Socio-Epistemic Model of Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Cited by 4 publications

References 43 publications

Efficacy information influences intention to take COVID‐19 vaccine

Efficacy information influences intention to take COVID‐19 vaccine

The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions

Understanding information: Adding a non‐individualistic lens

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