Mitigating distributed denial of service attacks with dynamic resource pricing

Abstract

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

Economic Levers for Mitigating Interest Flooding Attack in Named Data Networking

“…In fact, the idea of requiring the user to commit its resources before requesting services was described early by Dwork and Naor [20,21]. As early as about 10 years ago, Mankins et al [18] once introduced dynamic resource pricing models for mitigating distributed denial of service attacks. But their models were conceived under the scenarios with typical TCP/IP architectures, and thus some aspects need to be updated for NDN architecture accordingly.…”

“…As addressed in [18], micropayments can provide a useful side benefit by providing a uniform means of resource accounting, pricing, and arbitration. But micropayments mechanisms must not impose an undue performance penalty.…”

“…But we know that in fighting against DoS/DDoS attacks on today's Internet, micropayments have been extensively studied during the past two decades [18]. The idea of micropayments in fighting against DoS/DDoS attacks focuses on incurring heavy penalties such as "virtual money" (say, CPU cycles, memory/disk, bandwidth, etc.)…”

A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database

“…To deal with free riding, the underlying idea is that sharing can be encouraged by imposing a cost on the downloads, but ensuring that those who share more freely do not incur this cost, and this way dealing with user selfinterest. In Mankins et al's micropayment scheme [50], published in 2001, users are given an incentive to work together toward a common goal through the introduction of these puzzles. Authors present and evaluate several types of micropayment variants.…”

Combating Spam and Denial-of-Service Attacks with Trusted Puzzle Solvers

“…Back independently invented "hashcash" [3]. Other applications of Proof-of-Work puzzles include metering visits to websites [15], providing incentives in peer-to-peer systems [27], mitigating (distributed) DoS attacks [21,2,12], rate-limiting TCP connections [18] and defending against Sybil attacks [7]. Finally, Roman et al [26] proposed a scheme that uses pre-challenges to fight spam, in which the pre-challenges can range from, e.g., security questions to micro-payments to CAPTCHAs [30].…”