2009 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory 2009
DOI: 10.1109/isit.2009.5206043
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Mixed anti-jamming strategies in fixed-rate wireless systems over fast fading channels

Abstract: This is the first part of a two-part paper that studies the problem of jamming in a fixed-rate transmission system with fading, under the general assumption that the jammer has no knowledge about either the codebook used by the legitimate communication terminals, or the source's output. Both transmitter and jammer are subject to power constraints which can be enforced over each codeword (short-term / peak) or over all codewords (long-term / average), hence generating different scenarios. All our jamming proble… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
2

Citation Types

1
32
1

Year Published

2009
2009
2014
2014

Publication Types

Select...
4
1
1

Relationship

1
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 8 publications
(34 citation statements)
references
References 14 publications
(50 reference statements)
1
32
1
Order By: Relevance
“…The transmitter and the jammer have the same power budgets, namely, letT =J = 3. The jammer fading and transmitter gains are given by ((1, 5), (2, 4)), (3,3), (4, 2), (5, 1)) and ((20, 1), (4,2), (3,3), (2,4), (1,5)), respectively. For the optimization scenario we assume that the transmitter applies the uniform strategy T 0 , so T 0 = (3/5, 3/5, 3/5, 3/5, 3/5).…”
Section: Numerical Examples: Comparing Optimization and Game Plotsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The transmitter and the jammer have the same power budgets, namely, letT =J = 3. The jammer fading and transmitter gains are given by ((1, 5), (2, 4)), (3,3), (4, 2), (5, 1)) and ((20, 1), (4,2), (3,3), (2,4), (1,5)), respectively. For the optimization scenario we assume that the transmitter applies the uniform strategy T 0 , so T 0 = (3/5, 3/5, 3/5, 3/5, 3/5).…”
Section: Numerical Examples: Comparing Optimization and Game Plotsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The recent literature covers a variety of jamming problems [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [13], [14], [15].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The optimal payoffs v D , v I and the Jain's fairness indexes J D , J I for dependent and independents plots are given in Table 1 as functions on α = 0.1(0.2)0.9 and p 1 = 0.0(0.1)1.0. We assume that g = ((5, 1), (4,2), (3,3), (2,4), (1,5)) and h = ((1, 1), (1, 1), (1, 1), (1, 1), (1, 1)) and for the independent plot we assume that K = L q i = p i , i ∈ [1, K]. We consider three cases of jamming power: (a) a small total jamming powerJ = 0.1 (Table 1), (b) a comparable total jamming powerJ = 1 with the base station power (Table 2) and (c) an overwhelming jamming power over the base station oneJ = 30 (Table 3).…”
Section: Numerical Examples For the Game Plotsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Namely, we develop a concept of α-fairness under uncertainty to allocate power resource in the presence of a jammer under two types of uncertainty: (a) the decision maker does not have complete knowledge about the parameters of the environment but knows only their distribution, (b) the jammer can come into the environment with some probability bringing extra background noise. These scenarios have not been considered previously in the literature (see e.g., [1][2][3][4] and references therein). The goal of the decision maker is to maximize the α-fairness utility function with respect to the SNIR (signal to noise-plus-interference ratio).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, jammers that target the physical layer of the network, because of their simplicity and effectiveness, are of interest here. For instance, in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], strategies to combat one such jammer are considered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%