Mixed electoral rules’ impact on party systems

Nishikawa, Misa; Herron, Erik S.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2003.10.004

Cited by 50 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…The literature on mixed electoral systems has found that they are in certain respects "different from the sum of their parts" (K. E. Cox & Schoppa, 2002;Herron & Nishikawa, 2001;Nishikawa & Herron, 2004;Shugart & Wattenberg, 2001). A model was therefore run with dummy variables for SMD and mixed systems rather than the proportion of single-member seats (Model 2).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct

Birch

2007

Comparative Political Studies

108

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This article is a cross-national study of the impact of electoral system design on electoral misconduct. It argues that elections held in single-member districts (SMD) under plurality and majority rule are more likely to be the object of malpractice than those run under proportional representation (PR). Two reasons are advanced in support of this argument: Candidates in SMD systems have more to gain from individual efforts to manipulate elections than is the case for candidates in PR contests; and malfeasance is more efficient under SMD rules, in that the number of votes that must be altered to change the outcome is typically smaller than it is under PR. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed on a new data set of electoral manipulation in 24 postcommunist countries between 1995 and 2004. The proportion of seats elected in SMDs is found to be positively associated with levels of electoral misconduct, controlling for a variety of contextual factors.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct

Birch

2007

Comparative Political Studies

108

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“…These results persuasively show that more theoretical and empirical study is required to better determine the effects of mixed versus proportional representative electoral systems. Scholars have made first steps toward this (Herron & Nishikawa, 2001;Nishikawa & Herron, 2004), but systematic examination of the comparative effect of different institutional structures on political outcomes in the postcommunist environment is called for. Though there has been much support for mixed electoral systems for reasons such as their ability to represent voters in parliament through both national party lists and individual candidates in local districts, the results here suggest that, at least in cases where the party system is underdeveloped, mixed electoral systems are a poor choice.…”

Section: Implications and Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Postcommunist World

Epperly

2011

Comparative Political Studies

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The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both Western Europe and Latin America, levels that have deleterious effects on party consolidation and representative democracy in the region. This article presents a model of postcommunist legislative electoral volatility, testing explanations developed in Western Europe and Latin America and refining them for the different experi ence of the twin transition to both democracy and capitalism. Pooled crosssectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 67 legislative elections in 19 countries, covering the 1991-2006 period. Results demonstrate that, contrary to previous studies in other regions and of the first decade of the postcommunist era, economic determinants of volatility are of minimal salience. Rather, the institutional arrangement of the electoral system is found to be critically important, as is the more thorough "Leninist" or "Soviet" legacy in the states of the former Soviet Union.

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“…Some voters do not make these two choices independently, but instead use information about the choices in one tier to help make the choice in the other tier. These sorts of "contamination" effects have been the subject of a great deal of research Nishikawa and Herron 2004;. In the introduction to this volume, Batto and Cox argue that directly elected executives shape the legislative party system differently than indirectly elected executives.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By combining the advantages of plurality rule and proportional representation, these mixed systems attempt to strike a balance between the two. The intended and unintended consequences of such hybrid efforts have attracted considerable attention from scholars (e.g., Ferrara 2004;Golder 2005;Huang and Wang 2014;Huang, Wang, and Kuo 2008;Kostadinova 2002;Kohno 1997;Kuo, Huang, and Wang 2012;Lin 2008;Massicotte and Blais 1999;Scheiner 2004, 2012;Nishikawa and Herron 2004;Norris 2004;Reed 1999). Since the 1990s, democratic countries all over the world, as diverse as Italy, Scotland, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, Albania, Hungary, Georgia, Lithuania, and New Zealand, have adopted mixed-member electoral systems.…”

Section: Dual Candidacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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Mixed electoral rules’ impact on party systems

Cited by 50 publications

References 25 publications

Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct

Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct

Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Postcommunist World

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

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