Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate

Abstract

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate A enjoys an advantage over the other candidate D. Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some xed distance . The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Information and Strategic Political Polarisation

“…Aragonés and Palfrey (2002), Castanheira (2003) and Kartik and McAfee (2007) show that purely opportunistic parties may choose a polarised ideology even if they have no policy preference. In Aragonés and Palfrey, this requires one party to have an exogenous valence advantage 5 .…”

“…The novelty of our approach lies in the combination of two factors. First, in contrast to the literature on valence (Groseclose, 2001; Aragonés and Palfrey, 2002), we assume that politicians are perfectly identical ex ante . To increase the quality of their platform, candidates have to undertake some costly and unobservable action, under the anticipation that quality helps to win the election 1 .…”

Elections, Information, and State‐Dependent Candidate Quality

“…Other contributions to the literature on known valence include Ansolabehere and Snyder () and Aragones and Palfrey (, ). The seminal reference is Stokes ().…”

The Political Economy of Governance

“…These may vary from informational or media-related factors (e.g.,Grosser and Palfrey 2013;DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) to candidates' diverging policy preferences (e.g.,) and candidates' valence characteristics (e.g.,Aragonès and Palfrey 2002;Aragonès and Xefteris 2012;Schofield and Kurella 2015;Serra 2010).…”