Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures

Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.; Bulavsky, V. A.; Kalashnykova, Nataliya I.; Castillo, Felipe J.

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.10.036

Cited by 36 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Based upon the consistency criterion proposed in Kalashnikov et al (2011), we formulate the following definition. Here, for simplicity, we repeat our assumption that the utility function for each location i and each potential migrant group k is linear of the form  …”

Section: Existence Of a Bi-level Equilibrium With Consistent Conjecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium In A Bilevel Human Migration Model

Kalashnikov¹,

Kalashnykova²,

Garcia³

et al. 2012

IBER

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In this paper, we develop a bi-level human migration model using the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE). In contrast to previous works, here we construct a bi-level programming model. The upper level agents are municipalities of competing locations, whose strategies are investments into infrastructures of the locations (cities, towns, etc.). These investments aim at making the locations more attractive for both the residents and potential migrants from other locations. At the lower level of the model, the present residents (grouped into professional communities) are also considered as potential migrants to other locations. They make their decision where to migrate (if at all) comparing the expected values of the utility functions of the destinations and original locations, which are estimated by taking into account their group's conjectures concerning equilibrium migration flows between the involved locations. Applying a special technique to verify the consistency of the conjectures (influence coefficients), the existence and uniqueness results for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) are established.

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Section: Existence Of a Bi-level Equilibrium With Consistent Conjecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium In A Bilevel Human Migration Model

Kalashnikov¹,

Kalashnykova²,

Garcia³

et al. 2012

IBER

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“…The results obtained in Bulavsky (1997) for classical oligopoly models were extended in Kalashnikov et al (2011) to a mixed oligopoly model. In the same manner as in Bulavsky andKalashnikov (1994, 1995), the authors considered a conjectural variations oligopoly model, in which the degree of influence upon the general situation by each agent is modeled by special parameters (influence coefficients).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…All the above-mentioned papers deal in various modes with games with conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE). A more detailed story of the "highs and lows" of the CVE can be found in Kalashnikov et al (2011Kalashnikov et al ( , 2017 . However, for the sake of a complete list of the predecessors, we briefly repeat the short survey presented in Kalashnikov et al (2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Special Issue on Variational Inequalities: Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

2019

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We keep investigating the properties of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) developed for a single-commodity oligopoly. Although, in general, the consistent conjectures are distinct from those of Cournot-Nash, in our previous papers, we established the following remarkable fact. Define a meta-model as such where the players are the same agents as in the original oligopoly but now using the conjectures as their strategies. Then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the meta-model generated the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in the original oligopoly. In this paper, we study the conditions under which the inverse is also true, that it, every consistent CVE provides for the Cournot-Nash optimal strategies for the metamodel. This equivalence allows one to extend the concept of CCVE to other kinds of economic and financial models lacking the oligopoly structure.

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“…In this section, we propose a concept of consistency and formulate the existence result for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCEV). Based upon the consistency criterion proposed in [10], we formulate the following definition. Here, for simplicity, we recall our assumption that the affection utility function for each location i and every potential migrant group k are quadratic of the form The LLE with consistent conjectures is called a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVES) in application to the above-described human migration model.…”

Section: Existence Of a Bi-level Equilibrium With Consistent Conjecturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective Engineering in Application to Bi-Level Human Migration Models

Kalashnikov

Kalashnykova

Sánchez

2014

Industrial Applications of Affective Engineering

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In this paper, we develop a bi-level human migration model using the concepts of affective engineering (Kansei Engineering) and conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE). In contrast to previous existing works, we develop a bi-level programming model in a natural form. The upper level agents are municipalities of competing locations, whose strategies are investments into the infrastructures of the locations (cities, towns, etc.). These investments aim at making the locations more attractive for both residents and potential migrants from other locations, which clearly demands affective engineering tools. At the lower level of the model, the present residents (grouped into professional communities) are also potential migrants to other locations. and inbound locations, estimated by taking into account their group's conjectures concerning equilibrium migration flows between the involved locations. The utility functions reflect the affective engineering technique because their values are based on the potential migrants' affection to the target locations. Applying a special technique to verify the consistency of the conjectures (influence coefficients), the existence and uniqueness results for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) are established.

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Mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures

Cited by 36 publications

References 22 publications

Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium In A Bilevel Human Migration Model

Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium In A Bilevel Human Migration Model

Special Issue on Variational Inequalities: Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

Affective Engineering in Application to Bi-Level Human Migration Models

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