Mobile prepaid phone services

Lin, Yi‐Bing; Chang, Ming-Feng; Rao, Herman Chung-Hwa

doi:10.1109/98.847918

Cited by 24 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…The introduction of such an approach is to meet the mobile user's needs to gain network access in an area not covered by a single network provider (one of the SIM cards). Other examples of this model are ticket-based wireless LAN access (e.g at airports, cafes, hotels) and prepaid GSM cards (Lin, Chang, & Rao, 2000) (without roaming option).…”

Section: Traditional Mobile Authentication Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authentication in Ubiquitous Networking

Almuhaideb

Srinivasan

2015

International Journal of Information Security and Privacy

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Mobile authentication is an essential service to ensure the security of engaging parties in a ubiquitous wireless network environment. Several solutions have been proposed mainly based on both centralised and distributed authentication models to allow ubiquitous mobile access authentication; however, limitations still exist in these approaches, namely flexibility, security and performance issues and vulnerabilities. These shortcomings are influenced by the resource limitations of both wireless networks and the mobile devices together with inter-technology and inter-provider challenges. In this paper, the authors reviewed the major techniques in the field of ubiquitous mobile access authentication, which has attracted many researchers in the past decade. After investigating existing mobile authentication models and approaches, the common challenges are summarised to serve as the solution key requirements. The identified key solution requirements allow analysing and evaluating mobile authentication approaches.

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Section: Traditional Mobile Authentication Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authentication in Ubiquitous Networking

Almuhaideb

Srinivasan

2015

International Journal of Information Security and Privacy

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Coordinating access control in grid services

Chadwick

Laborde

2007

Concurrency and Computation

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We describe how to control the cumulative use of distributed grid resources by using coordination-aware policy decision points (coordinated PDPs) and an SQL database to hold 'coordination' data. When access to a resource is granted, obligations in the security policy ensure that the coordination database is updated. The coordination database is a normal grid service providing distributed access to the coordinated PDPs. Access to the databases is secured by the grid security infrastructure (GSI) and its own PDP, so that only authorized users (the coordinated PDPs) can access it. A coordinated PDP is imbedded into the Globus Toolkitv4 authorization chain as a custom PDP so that any grid service can be protected by a security policy that provides a coordination capability. Each coordinated PDP uses the services of an uncoordinated PDP to make its access control decisions, so that any existing stateless PDP can be supplemented with a coordination capability. We provide performance results for the coordinated PDPs and compare these with two stateless PDPs. Virtually the entire performance penalty of using coordinated PDPs is accounted for by the heavy costs of using GSI to secure communications between the coordinated PDPs and the coordination database. around with him. Providing a similar capability for grid jobs, for example, to limit the amount of storage or cpu that a user may request per day or per job from any location on the grid, is not so easy. The grid job will almost certainly run on different machines under different administrative control, will probably run under different account names on each machine, and the access control mechanism of one machine is typically unable to communicate with those of the other machines. The security token that is often passed from machine to machine is the proxy certificate [1], but this is not used by the policy decision points (PDPs) to communicate with each other and is not under their direct control (unlike the bank card inserted into an ATM). Consequently, the design of a policy-based coordinated access control system presents a number of challenges.The lack of communication between the PDPs of distributed applications can be addressed today by sidestepping the issue and using a centralized PDP with a common policy that is used by all the grid resources (see Figure 1). Such a system has been available for several years to grid applications that use Globus Toolkit (GT) from v3.3 onwards. GT is capable of making an external authorization callout using the GGF SAML authorization protocol specification [2], and several PDPs such as PERMIS [3] and PRIMA [4] have implemented this protocol. This sort of access control infrastructure allows a common policy to be used by all the resources of a grid, but since most PDPs today are stateless they are still unable to coordinate their access control decisions across multiple access requests. A further disadvantage of this configuration is that the central PDP is a bottleneck to performance because every request needs to be diverted ...

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