Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation: Poverty alleviation in a Chinese county

Abstract

This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of ‘institutionalized mobilization’, we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and kuai kuai (块块) relationships within the bureaucracy and the strengthening of state–society relations. We also point out the many problems resulting from this mode of institutionalized mobilization. Finally, we compare the political and geographical conditions in H county with those in two other counties – E and K – to ascertain whether the results of poverty alleviation are sustainable.

From poverty to trust: Political implications of the anti-poverty campaign in China

“… 10. Internal documents gained during fieldwork in S province in 2019. Similar requirements are also found by other researchers (Tsai and Liao, 2020: 55). …”

“…As the centerpiece of the CCP’s agenda and promise to build a ‘moderately prosperous’ society ( xiaokang shehui ), the TPA program was launched in 2014 with an ambitious plan to eradicate rural poverty by 2020. It is the ‘largest project to win people’s hearts’ and also reflects the top leader’s intention of selecting outstanding cadres and strengthening grassroots governance (Tsai and Liao, 2020). 2 Measures such as the development of competitive industries to rejuvenate rural economy and relocation of the poor who live in geologically hazardous area have been adopted to achieve this goal.…”

“…10 A county in G province established the ‘6 assistance’ and ‘5 must-visit’ policies, and stipulated that every official must do three to five practical things ( banshishi ) for their paired poor households each year. 11 Meanwhile, the impoverished households have a role in assessing cadres’ work performance in poverty alleviation by rating the service they have received and providing their fingerprints to certify that village officials have actually visited their home (Tsai and Liao, 2020: 56). Records of these visits constitute a major component in the evaluation of poverty-reduction performance, and the evaluation results affect officials’ career prospects.…”

“…12 The pair-up mechanism provides clear, routinized and easy-to-access channels for poor households to bring their problems and demands to the attention of local officials. Furthermore, its role in determining cadre performance evaluation increases officials’ responsiveness to villagers’ needs (Tsai and Liao, 2020).…”

Understanding Experimentation and Implementation: A Case Study of China’s Government Transparency Policy

“…The other is more negative: it points to routine policy misimplementation, including "uneven implementation" across regions (Göbel 2011), "selective implementation" of some measures but not others (O'Brien and Li 1999), and the undermining of performance targets through "pernicious gaming" (Gao 2015) and "collusion" (Zhou 2010) by leaders at different levels. Some of the most recent studies of local governance have softened the sharp contrast between successful experimentation and unsuccessful implementation by examining "failed experiments" (Miao and Lang 2015;Yasuda 2020) on the one hand, or "effective" (Ahlers and Schubert 2015) and "enthusiastic" (Deng, O'Brien, and Chen 2018;Tsai and Liao 2020) implementation on the other hand. Still, more work is needed to add nuance to the upstream image of a central government that skillfully devises and wisely chooses among experiments, and the downstream image of much going awry when policies are executed.…”