Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism

Vaidya, Anand Jayprakash

doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9093-7

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…S4 is controversial. There are arguments against S4 due to Nathan Salmon (1989), which are re-articulated and further defended by Vaidya (2008) in the context of the epistemology of modality. However, there is a powerful response in favor of preserving S4 offered by Roca-Royes (2006) and a further defense in Williamson (2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

Vaidya

Wallner

2018

Synthese

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There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998-2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactualtheory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.

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confidence: 99%

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

Vaidya

Wallner

2018

Synthese

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“…Vaidya (2008) (2007) and (2013) could not lead one to conclude that (W) holds. More importantly, what is crucial is whether the proof of the logical equivalence in CG requires assuming S 5 .…”

Section: The Paradox Of Modal Logic and Modal Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 97%

On the role of modal intuition in modal logic

Jayprakash¹

2014

Belgr Philosop Ann

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“…Her identification of metaphysical and epistemic modality is considered as an association of the former to the latter. In contrast, the dualist presents herself as the one who champions the existence of a genuinely metaphysical kind of possibility, a possibility which turns out to be restricted relative to epistemic possibility (see e.g., Scott, 2010, Soames, 2005 or Vaidya, 2008). This characterization might not be completely inadequate as a characterization of the modal dualist's opposition to Chalmers and Jackson, who usually figure as her main opponents.…”

Section: The Modal Dualist Notion Of Epistemic Possibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Against modal dualism

Franken

2021

European J of Philosophy

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Modal dualism is the claim that there is a space of epistemically possible worlds that exceeds the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In the present paper, I argue that modal dualism is false. I do so via an argument that differs from most previous arguments against modal dualism in that it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism or modal rationalism. The point of my argument is, instead, that modal dualism is internally inconsistent because it is the result of the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the abandonment of these semantic and epistemological assumptions. The relevant inconsistency manifests itself in the modal dualist notion of epistemic modality. For this notion to play the explanatory roles assigned to it by modal dualists, it has to be a notion of a genuinely epistemic kind of modality. But the only way to make sense of such a notion is via just those semantic or epistemological assumptions that the modal dualist is keen to avoid. Anyone willing to abandon these assumptions has to go further and detach the epistemic from the modal altogether. | INTRODUCTIONOnce there was a golden triangle among meaning, modality, and rationality (see e.g., Chalmers, 2006b, 55). As long as this golden triangle were intact, necessity, analyticity, and apriority were regarded as equivalent. The idea is appealing: When do we need no empirical evidence to know a sentence to be true (apriority)? Iff it is true regardless of how the world is. When is a sentence true regardless of how the world is (necessity)? Iff it is true just in virtue of the meanings of its components. When is a sentence true just in virtue of the meanings of its components

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Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism

Cited by 17 publications

References 14 publications

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

On the role of modal intuition in modal logic

Against modal dualism

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