Modal Virtue Epistemology

Beddor, Bob; Pavese, Carlotta

doi:10.1111/phpr.12562

Cited by 54 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 50 publications

(72 reference statements)

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“…But what is sufficient normality? Beddor and Pavese [2019] say the easy possibilities are those that are at least as normal as the actual world. In a good case where the actual world is very normal, the agent knows a lot, because few possibilities are as normal.…”

Section: Normalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See for example [Dretske 1981;Greco 2014;Stalnaker 2015;Goodman and Salow 2018;Carter 2019;Beddor and Pavese 2019;Carter and Goldstein Forthcoming].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, consider the model from Beddor and Pavese [2019], where a world is sufficiently normal when it is as normal as actuality. In that case, at a world with exactly m flips, the easy possibilities are those where the coin flips at most m times.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Counterfactual Contamination

Goldstein

Hawthorne

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn't easily have been wrong about p. But the notion of easy possibility in play is relatively undertheorized. One structural idea in the literature, the principle of Counterfactual Closure (CC), connects easy possibility with counterfactuals: if it easily could have happened that p, and if p were the case, then q would be the case, it follows that it easily could have happened that q. We first argue that while CC is false, there is a true restriction of it to cases involving counterfactual dependence on a coin flip. The failure of CC falsifies a model where the easy possibilities are counterfactually similar to actuality. Next, we show that extant normality models, where the easy possibilities are the sufficiently normal ones, are incompatible with the restricted CC thesis involving coin flips. Next, we develop a new kind of normality theory that can accommodate the restricted version of CC. This new theory introduces a principle of Counterfactual Contamination, which says roughly that any world is fairly abnormal if at that world very abnormal events counterfactually depend on a coin flip. Finally, we explain why coin flips and other related events have a special status. A central take home lesson is that the correct principle in the vicinity of Safety is importantly normality-theoretic rather than (as it is usually conceived) similarity-theoretic.

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Section: Normalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See for example [Dretske 1981;Greco 2014;Stalnaker 2015;Goodman and Salow 2018;Carter 2019;Beddor and Pavese 2019;Carter and Goldstein Forthcoming].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Counterfactual Contamination

Goldstein

Hawthorne

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…In contrast with this "hybrid view" of skill, Stanley and Williamson (2017) argue that skills are not themselves knowledge states but rather dispositions to know. Starting from considerations stemming from the role of knowledge in action theory, Pavese ( 2013 ) and Beddor and Pavese ( 2020 ) argue instead for a radical form of intellectualism, according to which both skill and know-how are knowledge states, for only knowledge states appropriately characterized can explain the distinctive intentionality and control of skillful performance.…”

Section: I2 Skill In Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise

Fridland¹,

Pavese²

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise

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The diverse and breathtaking intelligence of the human animal is often embodied in skills. People, throughout their lifetimes, acquire and refi ne a vast number of skills. And there seems to be no upper limit to the creativity and beauty expressed by them. Think, for instance, of Olympic gymnastics: the amount of strength, fl exibility, and control required to perform even a simple beam routine amazes, startles, and delights. In addition to the sheer beauty of skill, performances at the pinnacle of expertise often display a kind of brilliance or genius. We observe an intelligence that saturates the body. The unity of physicality and intellect, mind and body, meshed and melded. Apart from sports, people develop a host of other skills, including musical and artistic skills, linguistic and social skills, scientifi c and medical skills, military and political skills, engineering skills, computer skills, business skills, etc. What's more, skill acquisition and refi nement occur throughout the human lifespan. Children work on skills from infancy and throughout development and adults will often continue to refi ne skills through old age. The variety, ubiquity, and centrality of skills in the lives of humans is quite simply remarkable. Although notions of skill and expertise have always fi gured prominently in a variety of philosophical discussions, the last couple of decades have seen an explosion of direct interest in skill and practical expertise. Crucially, debates about know-how and virtue epistemology have fueled interest in the notion of skill and practical knowledge in areas such as epistemology, ethics, and action theory. Also, philosophers of cognitive science, as well as neuroscientists and psychologists, have become increasingly interested in issues concerning the nature of embodied expertise, motor skill, motor representation, and bodily control. As a result, across a variety of subfi elds from ancient and eastern philosophy, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, philosophy of perception, epistemology, action theory, ethics, political and social philosophy, and aesthetics, the debate concerning skill and practical intelligence is growing and thriving. It is the aim of this Handbook to collect and systematize the most relevant positions in these burgeoning areas of philosophy and cognitive science. Contained within are 39 chapters written by leaders in their fi elds, addressing the role of skill in the history of philosophy both East and West, epistemology, political philosophy, ethics, and various areas of the cognitive sciences,

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“…In the early years, noncognitivists proclaimed that there are no normative beliefs (e.g.,Ayer 1936). But…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A solution to the many attitudes problem

Beddor

2019

Philos Stud

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According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great e ort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.

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Modal Virtue Epistemology

Cited by 54 publications

References 50 publications

Counterfactual Contamination

Counterfactual Contamination

Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise

A solution to the many attitudes problem

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