Modalism and theoretical virtues: toward an epistemology of modality

Abstract

According to modalism, modality is primitive. In this paper, we examine the implications of this view for modal epistemology, and articulate a modalist account of modal knowledge. First, we discuss a theoretical utility argument used by David Lewis in support of his claim that there is a plurality of concrete worlds. We reject this argument, and show how to dispense with possible worlds altogether. We proceed to account for modal knowledge in modalist terms.

Putting modal metaphysics first

“…Indeed, a number of authors in the literature have recently advocated a sharply empirical turn in modal epistemology, often with the goal of eschewing traditional a priori means for knowledge of metaphysical modality (e.g. Bueno and Shalkowski 2015;Fischer and Leon 2017;Vetter 2016). But note also that there has already been an opposite push-back (see Mallozzi: forthcoming).…”

Modal Epistemology Without Detours

“…The restriction to proofs actually produced by the 3For more on this, cf. (Bueno and Shalkowski, 2015). 4In the context of the nature of modality rather than its epistemology, I discuss Leftow's view, with special attention to how it fares compared to Lewis's modal realism in (Shalkowski, 2015).…”

“…(Bueno and Shalkowski, 2015). 4In the context of the nature of modality rather than its epistemology, I discuss Leftow's view, with special attention to how it fares compared to Lewis's modal realism in (Shalkowski, 2015). likes of us has the virtue of solving the epistemological component of the Benacerraf Problem, but at the cost of philosophical narcissism.…”

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

“…An inconsistent theory (assuming classical logic) is maximally expressive, but clearly not true. [For further difficulties faced by theoretical utility arguments, see Bueno and Shalkowski (2015). ]…”