Modality, Weights and Inconsistent Premise Sets

Silk, Alex

doi:10.1093/jos/ffx014

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…These theories treat the relevant items, in one way or another, as quantifiers over worlds that are "best" (in one way or another) according to a scalar concept of GOODNESS (OF WORLDS), and the objection to Lewis' theory could be applied here as well. See however Katz, Portner & Rubinstein 2012;Silk 2012; von Fintel 2012 for various efforts to account for this kind of information-sensitivity within the broad framework of Kratzer's theory.…”

Section: Inferential Properties Of Deontic Scalesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Graded Modality

Lassiter¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This book explores graded expressions of modality, a rich and underexplored source of insight into modal semantics. Studies on modal language to date have largely focussed on a small and non-representative subset of expressions, namely modal auxiliaries such as must, might, and ought. Here, Daniel Lassiter argues that we should expand the conversation to include gradable modals such as more likely than, quite possible, and very good. He provides an introduction to qualitative and degree semantics for graded meaning, using the Representational Theory of Measurement to expose the complementarity between these apparently opposed perspectives on gradation. The volume explores and expands the typology of scales among English adjectives and uses the result to shed light on the meanings of a variety of epistemic and deontic modals. It also demonstrates that modality is deeply intertwined with probability and expected value, connecting modal semantics with the cognitive science of uncertainty and choice.

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Section: Inferential Properties Of Deontic Scalesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Graded Modality

Lassiter¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…(Harman (1993) is one among many to have made this point. For recent work on the semantic difference between weak and strong deontic necessity modals, see, for example, von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), Silk (2012) and Finlay (2014, ch. 3)). I ignore this subtlety in the present paper; Turri could simply restate the problem in terms of 'must'.…”

Section: Resolving Turri's Puzzle About Withholding 231mentioning

confidence: 99%

Resolving Turri's Puzzle about Withholding

Becker

2016

Dialectica

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Turri (2012) describes a case in which a group of experts apparently correctly advise you not to withhold on a proposition P, but where your evidence neither supports believing nor disbelieving P. He claims that this presents a puzzle about withholding: on the one hand, it seems that you should not withhold on P, since the experts say so. On the other hand, we have the intuition that you should neither believe nor disbelieve P, since your evidence doesn't support it. Thus, there is apparently no doxastic attitude you are permitted to adopt to P. Turri considers various solutions to the puzzle, but in the end rejects all of them and concludes that it seems to be unsolvable. I suggest resolving the puzzle by distinguishing between what I call the subjective and the collective ‘should’. In light of your, the subject's, evidence, i.e., in the subjective sense of ‘should’, you should neither believe nor disbelieve P. However, in light of your and the experts' combined evidence, i.e., in the collective sense of ‘should’, you should not withhold on P. It is true that you are not permitted to adopt a doxastic attitude if you should not, in the subjective sense of ‘should’, adopt it; but this is not so if you should not adopt it in the collective sense. Thus, you are actually permitted to withhold on P. The puzzle is nonetheless philosophically interesting since it points something out that deserves more discussion in epistemology: epistemic advice and the collective sense of the doxastic ‘should’, which we use when giving epistemic advice.

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“…Na seção 3, apresentamos o 3. Ver Portner (2009), Yalcin (2010), Katz et al (2012), Klecha (2014), Portner e Rubinstein (2016), Lassiter (2017), Silk (2017), inter alia. Para o português brasileiro, ver, em especial, Pessotto (2014) e a entrevista de Angelika Kratzer a Roberta Pires de Oliveira e Ana Pessotto (Kratzer et.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Modalidade com graus? Necessidade fraca e o verbo dever do português

Ferreira

2020

DELTA

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RESUMO Neste artigo, discutimos a motivação e adequação de uma semântica de graus para o verbo modal dever do português, no âmbito de uma crescente literatura sobre o papel da noção de gradação na semântica modal. Exploramos analogias com outros domínios já mais bem mapeados e com os quais a modalidade expressa por dever parece guardar certa relação semântica. Passamos por questões relacionadas à quantificação, probabilidade, gradação e pluralidade, numa amostra das complexidades que a semântica desse verbo nos coloca. Cotejamos dever com determinantes proporcionais, adjetivos graduáveis, DPs universais restritos e descrições definidas plurais, a fim de avaliar a adequação de certas ideias e ferramentas analíticas que tem emergido nesse campo.

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Modality, Weights and Inconsistent Premise Sets

Cited by 6 publications

References 39 publications

Graded Modality

Graded Modality

Resolving Turri's Puzzle about Withholding

Modalidade com graus? Necessidade fraca e o verbo dever do português

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