Modalization of movement: The problem of sensus communis and the limits of phenomenology

Abstract

One of the most persistent problems in accounting for the constitution of subjective experience is the question of the unity of consciousness. In the phenomenological tradition this question is often approached through concepts such as ipseity, pre-reflective consciousness, ownership, and first-person perspective. Since Aristotle, the question of unity in an experiencing subject has been associated with the notion of “common sensibles” and the concept of “ sensus communis” as that which joins the proper sense modalities in a single center. In this article it is argued that both the classical and the phenomenological solutions to the problem of unity point to the central challenge of how to account for the experience of movement and it is questioned whether a phenomenology of movement gets us closer to an understanding of sensus communis as a primordial relational force in the body–world formation.

New materialism and postmodern subject models fail to explain human memory and self-awareness: A comment on Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020)

“…Among other issues, future theoretical discussions should explore the embodied nature of self-awareness and the human ability to perceive and represent ourselves even at the prereflective level (Bielas & Michalczyk, 2019; Ciaunica & Crucianelli, 2019; Nida-Rümelin, 2017; Picolas & Soueltzis, 2019). By positing the question of the unity of consciousness (Levin et al, 2019), how (and if) human subjects are able to integrate different components from the experience of streams of consciousness into one integrative, superordinate internal stream of semiotic content should be explored (see e.g., Rafieian, 2012). Within the self-memory system model (Conway & Holmes, 2004), it is also relevant to consider how the recollection and construction of past, self-related memories are shaped by personal goal relevance.…”