Model-Based Verification and Validation of Spacecraft Avionics

Khan, Mohammed Omair; Sievers, Michael; Standley, Shaun

doi:10.2514/6.2012-2555

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…O'Halloran [14] shows how a Z-based toolset is used to prove the correctness of embedded real time safety critical software for Eurofighter Typhoon. Khan et al [15] argue that complexity of avionics has increased to a level that verification and validation of the systems need computer based approaches. They use model abstraction to simulate hardware and software interactions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Isabelle Insider framework to airplane security

Kammüller

Kerber

2021

Science of Computer Programming

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Isabelle Insider framework to airplane security

Kammüller

Kerber

2021

Science of Computer Programming

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“…[9] shows how a Z-based toolset is used to prove the correctness of embedded real time safety critical software for Eurofighter Typhoon. Khan et al [10] argue that complexity of avionics has increased to a level that verification and validation of the systems need computer based approaches. They use model abstraction to simulate hardware and software interactions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Applying the Isabelle Insider Framework to Airplane Security

Kammüller¹,

Kerber²

2020

Preprint

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Avionics is one of the fields in which verification methods have been pioneered and brought a new level of reliability to systems used in safety critical environments. Tragedies, like the 2015 insider attack on a German airplane, in which all 150 people on board died, show that safety and security crucially depend not only on the well functioning of systems but also on the way how humans interact with the systems. Policies are a way to describe how humans should behave in their interactions with technical systems, formal reasoning about such policies requires integrating the human factor into the verification process. In this paper, we report on our work on using logical modelling and analysis of infrastructure models and policies with actors to scrutinize security policies in the presence of insiders.We model insider attacks on airplanes in the Isabelle Insider framework. This application motivates the use of an extension of the framework with Kripke structures and the temporal logic CTL to enable reasoning on dynamic system states. Furthermore, we illustrate that Isabelle modelling and invariant reasoning reveal subtle security assumptions. We summarize by providing a methodology for the development of policies that satisfy stated properties.

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“…The related works are divided into the following four categories: the first one is related to the domain of model-driven engineering methods applied in the development of complex airborne systems in recent years; for instance, [21] introduced a verification analysis method based on modeldriven framework for aviation electronic system and [22] provided a modelling analysis example based on the system modeling language (SysML). The second one is about the research of MARTE and AADL (architecture analysis and design language) [23] in the design stage of complex embedded systems.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification Method for Configuration of Integrated Modular Avionics System Using MARTE

Wang

Chen

2018

International Journal of Aerospace Engineering

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The configuration information of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) system includes almost all details of whole system architecture, which is used to configure the hardware interfaces, operating system, and interactions among applications to make an IMA system work correctly and reliably. It is very important to ensure the correctness and integrity of the configuration in the IMA system design phase. In this paper, we focus on modelling and verification of configuration information of IMA/ARINC653 system based on MARTE (Modelling and Analysis for Real-time and Embedded Systems). Firstly, we define semantic mapping from key concepts of configuration (such as modules, partitions, memory, process, and communications) to components of MARTE element and propose a method for model transformation between XML-formatted configuration information and MARTE models. Then we present a formal verification framework for ARINC653 system configuration based on theorem proof techniques, including construction of corresponding REAL theorems according to the semantics of those key components of configuration information and formal verification of theorems for the properties of IMA, such as time constraints, spatial isolation, and health monitoring. After that, a special issue of schedulability analysis of ARINC653 system is studied. We design a hierarchical scheduling strategy with consideration of characters of the ARINC653 system, and a scheduling analyzer MAST-2 is used to implement hierarchical schedule analysis. Lastly, we design a prototype tool, called Configuration Checker for ARINC653 (CC653), and two case studies show that the methods proposed in this paper are feasible and efficient.

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Model-Based Verification and Validation of Spacecraft Avionics

Cited by 9 publications

References 1 publication

Applying the Isabelle Insider framework to airplane security

Applying the Isabelle Insider framework to airplane security

Applying the Isabelle Insider Framework to Airplane Security

Formal Verification Method for Configuration of Integrated Modular Avionics System Using MARTE

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