Model-Driven Information Flow Security for Component-Based Systems

Said, Najah Ben; Abdellatif, Takoua; Bensalem, Saddek; Bozga, Marius

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54848-2_1

Cited by 15 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Thus, any use request should be followed by an evaluation of all policy rules in all uses in the system to avoid conflicts and violations. Finally, we are considering frameworks, such as secBIP [9], that will allow us to compositionally analyse security properties and generate secure-by-construction systems. Also, we would like to explore guaranteeing security properties by-construction for any number of uses in our model through the application of architectures from predefined architecture styles [7] that capture properties of specific access and usage control policies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification of Usage Control Models: A Case Study of UseCON Using TLA+

Gouglidis

Grompanopoulos

Mavridou

2018

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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Usage control models provide an integration of access control, digital rights, and trust management. To achieve this integration, usage control models support additional concepts such as attribute mutability and continuity of decision. However, these concepts may introduce an additional level of complexity to the underlying model, rendering its definition a cumbersome and prone to errors process. Applying a formal verification technique allows for a rigorous analysis of the interactions amongst the components, and thus for formal guarantees in respect of the correctness of a model. In this paper, we elaborate on a case study, where we express the high-level functional model of the UseCON usage control model in the TLA+ formal specification language, and verify its correctness for ≤ 12 uses in both of its supporting authorisation models.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification of Usage Control Models: A Case Study of UseCON Using TLA+

Gouglidis

Grompanopoulos

Mavridou

2018

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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“…We also plan to specialize the approach presented in this paper to security-oriented properties. For instance, we will inspire from runtime enforcement of opacity properties for monolithic systems [27] and apply it to secureBIP [41], a secured version of the BIP framework.…”

Section: Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fully automated runtime enforcement of component-based systems with formal and sound recovery

Falcone

Jaber

2016

Int J Softw Tools Technol Transfer

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We introduce runtime enforcement of specifications on component-based systems (CBS) modeled in the BIP (Behavior, Interaction and Priority) framework. Runtime enforcement is an increasingly popular and effective dynamic validation technique aiming to ensure the correct runtime behavior (w.r.t. a formal specification) of a system using a socalled enforcement monitor. BIP is a powerful and expressive component-based framework for the formal construction of heterogeneous systems. Because of BIP expressiveness however, it is difficult to enforce complex behavioral properties at design-time.We first introduce a theoretical runtime enforcement framework for component-based systems where we delineate a hierarchy of enforceable properties (i.e., properties that can be enforced) according to the number of observational steps a system is allowed to deviate from the property (i.e., the notion of k-step enforceability). To ensure the observational equivalence between the correct executions of the initial system and the monitored system, we show that i) only stutter-invariant properties should be enforced on CBS with our monitors, and ii) safety properties are 1-step enforceable. Second, given an abstract enforcement monitor for some 1-step enforceable property, we define a series of formal transformations to instrument (at relevant locations) a CBS described in the BIP framework to integrate the monitor. At runtime, the monitor observes and automatically avoids any error in the behavior of the system w.r.t. the property. Third, our approach is fully implemented in RE-BIP, an available tool integrated in the BIP tool suite. Fourth, to validate our approach, we use RE-BIP to i) enforce deadlock-freedom on a dining philosophers benchmark, and ii) ensure the correct placement of robots on a map.

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“…The proposed model is general enough to deal with information flow security from a practical point of view for commonly used programming languages and/or modeling frameworks such as BPEL. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that this model is actually a strict subset of the secureBIP component model previously introduced in [6,7]. The latter considers additional coordination mechanisms through multiparty interactions as well as different definitions of non-interference.…”

Section: Component-based Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Sketch) It can be shown that the conditions above imply the unwinding conditions of [8] for indistinguishability ≈ s at security level s. In turn, unwinding conditions are guaranteeing non-interference and therefore security as defined in Definition 1. A detailed proof is available in [6,7] for a slightly more general component-based model allowing multiparty interactions between components.…”

Section: Security Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Robust Framework for Securing Composed Web Services

Said

Abdellatif

Bensalem

et al. 2016

Formal Aspects of Component Software

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This paper proposes a framework that automatically checks and configures data security in Web Services starting from high level business requirements. We consider BPEL-based composed Web Services. BPEL processes and initial security parameters are represented as component-based models labeled with security annotations. These models are formal and enable automated analysis and synthesis of security configurations, under the guidance of the service designer. The security property considered is the non-interference. The overall approach is practical since security is defined separately from functional processes and automatically verified. We illustrate its utility to solve intricate security problems using a smart grid application.

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Model-Driven Information Flow Security for Component-Based Systems

Cited by 15 publications

References 22 publications

Formal Verification of Usage Control Models: A Case Study of UseCON Using TLA+

Formal Verification of Usage Control Models: A Case Study of UseCON Using TLA+

Fully automated runtime enforcement of component-based systems with formal and sound recovery

A Robust Framework for Securing Composed Web Services

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