Model-Driven Security Policy Deployment: Property Oriented Approach

Abstract

Abstract. We address the issue of formally validating the deployment of access control security policies. We show how the use of a formal expression of the security requirements, related to a given system, ensures the deployment of an anomaly free abstract security policy. We also describe how to develop appropriate algorithms by using a theorem proving approach with a modeling language allowing the specification of the system, of the link between the system and the policy, and of certain target security properties. The result is a set of proved algorithms that constitute the certified technique for a reliable security policy deployment.

Specification, verification, and quantification of security in model-based systems

“…The specification patterns can be formalized in a first-order, real-time linear temporal logic augmented with epistemic constructs for security-related predicates. Preda et al [53] propose a formal technique that combines the use of access control policies expressed in the Organization-Based Access Control (OrBAC) [54] language together coupled with specifications based on the B-Method [55]. As application, the security requirements are expressed for the IPsec tunnels modeled by a sequence diagram.…”

Model-Driven Integration and Analysis of Access-control Policies in Multi-layer Information Systems

“…[1] provides a logical framework to encode multiple authorization policies into a proof-carrying authorization formalism. In [17] Method-B is used to formalize the deployment of AC policies on systems composed of several (network) components. Finally, by using model-driven techniques, in [5] the authors formalize the policy continuum model, that represent policies at different inter-related abstraction layers although it does not tackle the problem of inter-related architectural layers.…”

MIRAGE: A Management Tool for the Analysis and Deployment of Network Security Policies

“…Section 2.1). The formal frame to design the refinement mechanism of MIRAGE is presented in [18]. The policy deployment algorithms are developed using the B Method [2], a theorem proving method.…”

“…Thus, from the early stage of their B development (i.e., abstract B specification), the policy deployment algorithms of MIRAGE target the interesting security properties. Examples of security properties we took into account, and expressed as B invariants, in [18] are:…”

“…Developed as a web service, MIRAGE can autonomously be executed under the control of several operators in order to offer the system with the following functions: (1) an intra-component analysis which detects inconsistencies between rules within single security component policies [12,10]; (2) an inter-component analysis of rules to detect inconsistencies between configurations of different devices [15]; (3) an aggregation mechanism to fold all the existing policies into a single, and consistent, global set of rules [14]; and (4) a refinement process to properly deploy the global set of rules over new security components [17,18]. In all four cases, MIRAGE utilizes a description of the topology of the whole security architecture.…”