Modeling and simulation of defense game model for jamming attack in wireless sensor networks using evolutionary game theory

Abstract

The open and shared communication medium of wireless sensor networks creates vulnerability to various types of attacks. In particular, jamming is a kind of attack that is difficult to defend. When the jammer transmits the jamming signal, the nodes covered by the jamming signal will suffer for their transmission. The interactions between the jammer and the source nodes are complex. Thus this article models the interactions between the jammer and the source node as an evolutionary game-theoretical model.The game model of jamming is formulated, and then the evolutionary analysis of the game model is done. The game model is solved using replicator dynamics, and also the solution is verified by conducting various simulations. It can also be verified by using a stability diagram of replicator dynamics. The equilibrium points are analyzed to check whether that is an evolutionarily stable strategy. Extensive numerical simulation experiments have been carried out to analyze the evolution of strategies for source nodes and jammer nodes.

Construction of a Benchmark Model for the Evolution of Government Enterprise Cooperation under the ESG Concept

“…Evolutionary game theory first originated from the integration of rational economy and biology. It regards human beings as bounded rationality games, rather than perfect rationality people [12][13].…”