1999
DOI: 10.1016/s0957-1787(98)00016-2
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Modeling competition in electric energy markets by equilibrium constraints

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Cited by 74 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…• Including market power in unit-commitment models involves the addition of side constraints that mimic strategic behavior, e.g., enforcing that marginal revenue is greater than or equal to marginal cost only if the unit is committed [29]. As [19] explains, such a constraint could become unwieldy for multi-period models as the marginal revenue may drop below the marginal cost for committed units during off-peak periods depending on the fixed costs.…”
Section: Research Objectives and Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• Including market power in unit-commitment models involves the addition of side constraints that mimic strategic behavior, e.g., enforcing that marginal revenue is greater than or equal to marginal cost only if the unit is committed [29]. As [19] explains, such a constraint could become unwieldy for multi-period models as the marginal revenue may drop below the marginal cost for committed units during off-peak periods depending on the fixed costs.…”
Section: Research Objectives and Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Profit maximizing behavior of competitive GENCOs in a deregulated market can still be modeled in a traditional production cost model if markets and plants constraints are properly addressed [6]. Ramos et al [6] solved the production cost problem for unit commitment applying in a game theoretic framework and simulated the expected revenue of profit maximising generators.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ramos et al [6] solved the production cost problem for unit commitment applying in a game theoretic framework and simulated the expected revenue of profit maximising generators. In their work, generator revenues, however, are calculated based on the short run marginal prices.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Baslis et al [6] and Pousinho et al [7] studied the strategic behavior via Mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) for a single hydropower supplier. Scott et al modeled two hydropower suppliers in a decentralized duopoly market, but their model only works for a relatively small number of reservoirs [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%