Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique

Gintis, Herbert

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.041

Cited by 13 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…This confirms that cooperation is better in communities where members trust each other than in communities where trust is lacking. From a global perspective, this finding supports other studies demonstrating the importance of trust in human relations at various levels, and in various contexts (Ostrom 2000;Fischbacher et al 2001;Boyd and Richerson 2002;Gintis 2004;Andersson and Wengström 2011;Useche 2013;Saunders 2014). Cooperation is higher in communities that joined wildlife conservation earlier than in communities that joined later.…”

supporting

confidence: 88%

The role of institutions in community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe

Ntuli¹,

Muchapondwa²

2018

Int J Commons

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Abstract:Institutions play a significant role in stabilising large-scale cooperation in common pool resource management. Without restrictions to govern human behaviour, most natural resources are vulnerable to overexploitation. This study used a sample size of 336 households and community-level data from 30 communities around Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, to analyse the relationship between institutions and biodiversity outcomes in community-based wildlife conservation. Our results suggest a much stronger effect of institutions on biodiversity outcomes via the intermediacy of cooperation. Overall, the performance of most communities was below the desired level of institutional attributes that matter for conservation. Good institutions are an important ingredient for cooperation in the respective communities. Disaggregating the metric measure of institutions into its components shows that governance, monitoring and enforcement are more important for increased cooperation, while fairness of institutions seems to work against cooperation. Cooperation increases with trust and group size, and is also higher in communities that have endogenised punishment as opposed to communities that still rely on external enforcement of rules and regulations. Cooperation declines as we move from communal areas into the resettlement schemes and with increasing size of the resource system. A very strong positive relationship exists between cooperation and biodiversity outcomes implying that communities with elevated levels of cooperation are associated with a healthy wildlife population. Biodiversity outcomes are more successful in communities that either received wildlife management training, share information or those that are located far awayThe role of institutions in community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe 135 from urban areas and are not very close to the boundary of the game park. Erecting an electric fence, the household head's age, the number of years in school and number of years living in the area negatively affect biodiversity outcomes. One policy implication of this study is to increase autonomy in CAMPFIRE communities so that they are able to invest in good institutions, which allows them to self-organise and to manage wildlife sustainably.

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supporting

confidence: 88%

The role of institutions in community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe

Ntuli¹,

Muchapondwa²

2018

Int J Commons

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“…We therefore must search for more basic mechanisms that could already generate social order in much simpler societies. Unfortunately, conventional repeated game theorywhich is based on the assumption of Homo Economicus -has failed to produce plausible analytical models of social cooperation in a state of nature because these models do not have the required properties of dynamical stability and informational robustness (Gintis 2004) The Parsonian solution to social order, however, fails to integrate the mechanisms of norm internalization and the need for social approval into a coherent model of individual choice and social interaction (Wrong, 1961;Gintis 1975 Integrating the internalization of norms into decision theory can only be accomplished based on extensive empirical research. The sorts of armchair speculation often found in the discussion of "human nature" simply will not suffice.…”

Section: The Problem Of Social Order and Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

2007

Self Cite

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Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation emphasize the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation emphasize incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here we develop a general approach -the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach -showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the micro-foundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals. Abstract:Since Durkheim, sociological explanations of social cooperation emphasize the internalization of values that induce norm compliance. Since Adam Smith, economic explanations of social cooperation emphasize incentives that induce selfish individuals to cooperate. Here we develop a general approach -the Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints approach -showing that each of the above models is a special case. Our approach is based on evidence indicating that pure Homo Sociologicus and pure Homo Economicus views are wrong. We show that self-regarding and norm-regarding actors coexist and that the available action opportunities determine which of these actor types dominates the aggregate level of social cooperation. Our approach contributes to the solution of long-standing problems, including the problems of social order and collective action, the determinants and consequences of social exchanges, the micro-foundations of emergent aggregate patterns of social interactions, and the measurement of the impact of cultural and economic practices on individuals' social goals.

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“…For this purpose, distinct sets of conditions under which a Folk theorem holds have been identified (see Gintis, 2004, for a critical survey). This research line is very fascinating from both technical and philosophical perspectives, and it can reveal deep and subtle insights about strategic reasoning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The co-evolution of cooperation and defection under local interaction and endogenous network formation

Bilancini

Boncinelli

2009

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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"The Prisoner's Dilemma is a typical structure of interaction in human societies. In spite of a long tradition dealing with the matter from different perspectives, the emergence of cooperation or defection still remains a controversial issue from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view. In this paper we propose a local interaction model with endogenous network formation, in the attempt to provide a reasonable account of emerging behaviors. A population of boundedly rational agents repeatedly chooses to cooperate or defect. Each agent's action affects only her interacting mates, according to a network of re-lationships. Agents are randomly given the possibility to substitute undesired mates with unknown ones. Full cooperation, full defection and coexistence of both cooperation and defection in homogeneous clusters are possible outcomes of the model. Computer-based simulations are applied to investigate under what circumstances either case is most likely." [author's abstract

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Modeling cooperation among self-interested agents: a critique

Cited by 13 publications

References 45 publications

The role of institutions in community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe

The role of institutions in community wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe

Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations

The co-evolution of cooperation and defection under local interaction and endogenous network formation

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