Modeling Fault Trees Using Petri Nets

Górski, Janusz; Magott, Jan; Wardziński, Andrzej

doi:10.1007/978-1-4471-3054-3_7

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Definitions of the FTTD gates that have been described above, will be stated below, more detailed information can be found [5], [9], [10], [13]. We will use the following notation:…”

Section: The Notation Of the Fttdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Timing Requirements for Intrusion Detection and Prevention using Fault Tree with Time Dependencies

Škrobánek¹,

Woda²

2011

Intrusion Detection Systems

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IntroductionIn-depth analysis of an attack strategy enables p o s s i b i l i t y t o p r e v e n t i t o r w h en it i s inevitable to minimize its adverse effects. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) base their operation on the built-in patterns of various attack strategies. Aforementioned strategies can be represented by different means like: augmented goal-tree [6], attack trees [17] (originated from on fault trees), attack graphs [14], or augmented software fault trees [4]. In augmented goal tree representation [6], the attack is expressed by sequences of logically related steps. The root of this tree is the goal of the attack, e.g., "Modification of a file". The sub-goals are associated with the roots of the sub-trees. The basic constructs are the OR, AND, Ordered-AND constructs. For example, in order to achieve the sub-goal represented as the root of the Ordered-AND construct, all sub-sub-goals have to be reached in required order. Fault tree analysis (FTA) [3], which is a base of the attack tree [17] analysis, is a deductive probabilistic assessment technique. The FTA is the backward approach. In the fault tree, the root is associated with the top event being the hazard, e.g. "The Intrusion takes control over the Victim". Then direct causes of the hazard are considered. Next, the causes of the above causes are analyzed. Hence, different ways in which the hazard can occur are investigated. The FTA can be used to determine the following: minimal cut sets of faults that cause a hazard, probabilities of the hazard and faults. Therefore, the FTA can be used in identification which events are critical and should therefore be subjected to monitoring. Traditional Fault Trees (FT) are widely criticized [14] due to many, widely known drawbacks, like inability to model multiple attack attempts, time dependencies, or access controls as well as for luck of modeling cycles. In the attacks graphs [14], nodes symbolize the class of machines the attacker accessed and as well user level of privileges. The arcs are labeled by attackers' activities. By assigning probabilities of success on the arcs, one can identify the attack paths with the highest probability of success. Augmented software fault trees [4] were defined in order to overcome disadvantages of the classical fault trees. In this approach, a trust, a context, and temporal orderings can be defined. The trust relationship expresses that some members of a distributed system trust other members of the system. Context describes which subsets of intrusive events occur in www.intechopen.com Intrusion Detection Systems 308 some context. The activities of attackers and network are time dependent. Event and conditions involved in an intrusion often must occur in a particular order. In order to express the temporal orderings, the interval temporal logic [1] is applied. In this logic, the structure of time is a simple linear model of time, i.e., there is one past and one future only. Therefore, the attack scenario is a deterministic one. The fault tree with time dependencies ...

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“…Definitions of the FTTD gates that have been described above, will be stated below, more detailed information can be found [5], [9], [10], [13]. We will use the following notation:…”

Section: The Notation Of the Fttdmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Timing Requirements for Intrusion Detection and Prevention using Fault Tree with Time Dependencies

Škrobánek¹,

Woda²

2011

Intrusion Detection Systems

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show abstract

“…The trees can also be quantitatively evaluated to provide estimates of the probability of the top event occurring, given the probabilities of the constituent failures. Fault trees can have trouble dealing with timing (Gorski et al, 1995), redundancy, and differing mission phases (Leveson, 1995). It is also a time-consuming, qualitative technique, although its absolute accuracy is usually secondary to identifying failure sequences (Ozog & Bendixen, 1987).…”

Section: Top-down Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Safety-Critical Rehabilitation Robots

Roderick¹,

Carignan²

2007

Rehabilitation Robotics

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“…Hence, using FTA we cannot analyze an aspect such as for example, the minimum and maximum time in which the lack of cooling would not lead to a danger -reactor melt or how fast (at what time) we can stop the nuclear reaction. We can analyze that using other methods or using Fault Trees with Time Dependencies (FTsTD) [3,4]. The time dependencies (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimal cut sets with time dependencies analysis

Škrobánek

2013

automat

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Modeling Fault Trees Using Petri Nets

Cited by 16 publications

References 2 publications

Analysis of Timing Requirements for Intrusion Detection and Prevention using Fault Tree with Time Dependencies

Analysis of Timing Requirements for Intrusion Detection and Prevention using Fault Tree with Time Dependencies

Designing Safety-Critical Rehabilitation Robots

Minimal cut sets with time dependencies analysis

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