Modeling the Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Liu, Zhuping; Zhao, Qiuhong; Wang, Shouyang; Shi, Jianming

doi:10.1142/s0217595913500206

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Studies on information-sharing regulations have covered the fields of healthcare, finance, and supply chain [26]. Scholars often use a game-theoretic approach to study the regulation by building a two-sided, three-sided, or multi-sided monitoring model and conducting stability analyses [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34]. Equilibrium strategies have been analyzed and effective ways to enhance information regulation have been proposed.…”

Section: Information-sharing Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Effect on Information Sharing of Industrial Internet Platforms Based on Three Differentiated Game Scenarios

et al. 2022

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This study constructs a regulatory system for information sharing on industrial internet platforms from a technical and socio-legal perspective. A differentiated game is used to construct decentralized, centralized, and cost-sharing contract decision-making scenarios to obtain the optimal level of efforts for information-sharing regulation. Through a comparative analysis, the optimal solutions under the three scenarios were derived. These solutions were then analyzed through numerical simulations using Matlab2016a. Our research demonstrates the following: (1) Centralized decision-making is most beneficial to the development of information-sharing regulatory systems. (2) Beyond a critical value for the local government cost subsidy coefficients, changes in these coefficients have a more pronounced effect on improving the economic efficiency of the regulatory system, and vice versa. That is, when the cost subsidy coefficient is higher than 1/2, increasing the cost subsidy coefficient has a more pronounced effect on improving the economic efficiency of the information-sharing regulatory system. (3) In all scenarios, an increase in the regulatory effort can effectively enhance the reputation of the information-sharing regulatory system. This study further extends the research on information-sharing regulations and provides a practical guide to industrial internet platforms.

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Section: Information-sharing Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Effect on Information Sharing of Industrial Internet Platforms Based on Three Differentiated Game Scenarios

et al. 2022

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“…However, information sharing is not beneficial to all supply chain enterprises. If partial information sharing occurs only between distributors and retailers, rather than between distributors and manufacturers, it does not always benefit manufacturers, and in some cases, information sharing may harm manufacturers [36]. Moreover, the research results of reference [27] show that information sharing will lead to the loss of suppliers.…”

Section: Literature Review a Supply Chain Information Collaboration Or Information Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Logistics Information Collaboration Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Zhang

Xue

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Supply chain logistics information collaboration (SCLIC) is the basis and premise of supply chain logistics collaboration. An effective logistics information collaboration strategy can improve enterprises' chances of success in a new partnership in the supply chain. However, SCLIC is usually difficult to be achieved because of the complexity of the impact factor, strategy evolution process, and stability strategies. We propose an evolutionary game theory-based SCLIC strategy to solve this problem. Firstly, we build an evolutionary game model of SCLIC based on a two-echelon supply chain composed of suppliers and manufacturers. The strategy evolution game of suppliers, manufacturers, and the combination of manufacturers and suppliers are analyzed based on benefit maximization. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) is determined. Secondly, we analyze the impact of the relevant parameters on the strategy evolution process. And we use a comprehensive simulation to examine the efficiency of the proposed model. Finally, some managerial insights are presented for the supply chain enterprises to promote the realization of SCLIC.INDEX TERMS Supply chain logistic information collaboration, evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stability strategy. ABBREVIATIONS EGTEvolutionary game theory ESS Evolutionarily stable strategy NIS Neighborhood invader strategy SCIS Supply chain information sharing SCLIC Supply chain logistics information collaboration SCM Supply chain management

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“…Seifert et al [42] developed a three-echelon supply chain model with price-only contracts and sub-supply chain coordination. Liu et al [28] analyzed the impact of partial information sharing in a three-echelon supply chain. Saha [41] studied channel characteristics and coordination in three-echelon dual-channel supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A three-echelon supply chain model with price and two-level quality dependent demand

Roy

Giri

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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This paper considers a three-echelon supply chain model with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single product. We assume that the market demand at the retailer’s end is stochastic, but dependent on price and quality of the product. The final product’s quality depends on the manufacturing process and the raw material’s quality. We first develop models for centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then we try to coordinate the decentralized system with some contract mechanism. We show that revenue sharing contract is not able to coordinate the system, but a composite contract comprised of sales rebate and penalty (SRP) with return is able to coordinate the system. Finally, we illustrate the developed model with a numerical example and show the efficiency of SRP with return policy. We graphically show the effects of various model-parameters on the optimal decisions. Most of the existing literature’s focus on the quality of the finished product, but in this model we incorporate the quality of the raw material as a decision variable along with the finished product quality. We also able to coordinate the three echelon model with a composite contract which is seldom addressed in the existing literatures.

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Modeling the Impact of Partial Information Sharing in a Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Cited by 5 publications

References 17 publications

Regulatory Effect on Information Sharing of Industrial Internet Platforms Based on Three Differentiated Game Scenarios

Regulatory Effect on Information Sharing of Industrial Internet Platforms Based on Three Differentiated Game Scenarios

Supply Chain Logistics Information Collaboration Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

A three-echelon supply chain model with price and two-level quality dependent demand

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