Modeling without Mathematics

Thomson-Jones, Martin

doi:10.1086/667876

Cited by 21 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…9 See (Barrett and Halvorson [2015]) for a recent critical discussion of Glymour's ([1970]) and Quine's ([1975]) proposals. See (Thomson-Jones [2012]) for an idea about models that is similar to the one defended by Hendry and Psillos ([2007]). criteria for models having syntatically different yet theoretically equivalent descriptions.…”

Section: The New Fiction View Of Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Fiction View of Models

Salis¹

2021

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call the ‘new fiction view of models’. On this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they represent real-world phenomena if they stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the generation of two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. 1Introduction2Models as Games of Make-Believe3Standard Fiction Views of Models 3.1The indirect fiction view3.2The direct fiction view4The New Fiction View of Models5Answering the Identification Problem and the Problem of Truth Conditions6Conclusion

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Section: The New Fiction View Of Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The New Fiction View of Models

Salis¹

2021

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…That question is very much open. That said, that scientific accounts, including models, can be (ought to be) conceived as collections of propositions has been defended in the literature(Thomson-Jones, 2012). Note that authors who propose…”

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confidence: 99%

Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods

Bihan

2019

Synthese

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Elgin has argued that scientific models that are, strictly speaking, inaccurate representations of the world, are epistemically valuable because the "falsehoods" they contain are "felicitous". Many, including Elgin herself, have interpreted this claim as offering an alternative to scientific realism and "veritism". In this paper, I will argue that there is a more felicitous interpretation of Elgin's work: "felicitous falsehoods" do play a role in the epistemic value of inaccurate models, but that role is of instrumental value. Elgin's view is not best understood as claiming that falsehoods provide scientific understanding in and of themselves, only that they facilitate epistemic access to the fundamental, even if partial, truths that are contained within models. While falsehoods may be felicitous in that they facilitate exemplification, the epistemic value of inaccurate models ultimately relies on their partial accuracy. Keywords Understanding • Idealization • Models • Factivity • Realism If truth is mandatory, much of our best science turns out to be epistemologically unacceptable and perhaps intellectually dishonest. Our predicament is this: We can retain the truth requirement and construe science either as cognitively defective or as noncognitive, or we can reject, revise, or relax the truth requirement and remain cognitivists about and devotees of science. I take it that science provides an understanding of the natural order. By this I do not mean merely that an ideal science would provide such an understanding or that at the end of inquiry science will provide one, but that much actual science has done so and continues to do so. I take it, then, that much actual science is cognitively reputable-indeed, estimable. The view according to which truth is a "requirement" is dubbed "veritism" by Elgin. She claims that her account of scientific understanding offers an alternative to veritism, such that modern science, including its falsehoods, can be construed as having epistemic value.

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“…If models were identified merely by ontology or model–target relation, then from a mathematical perspective, these systems would be indistinguishable. But as Thomson-Jones (2012, 768) notes,the mathematical structures view seems committed to identifying both the pendulum model and the model of the electrical circuit with the mathematical structure they have in common and, thus, to insisting that the pendulum model and the model of the circuit are one and the same model.…”

Section: Three Features Of Scientific Modelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whether models are understood as fictions, abstract objects, mediators, or sets of propositions (Thomson-Jones 2012), there is a distinctive artifactual or intentional element present across the board. In other words, models are things that are designed by modelers to fit a certain purpose.…”

Section: Three Features Of Scientific Modelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, in terms of (3), modelers can construe the same natural model as a device for public health intervention strategies or a testing ground for immunity in larger populations analogously to the pendulum-circuit case of Thomson-Jones (2012). As we saw with the Diamond Princess , modelers focused on different aspects and features and draw different conclusions from the same system.…”

Section: Natural Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Motivating a Scientific Modeling Continuum: The Case of “Natural Models” in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Nefdt¹

2023

Philos. sci.

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The Covid-19 global pandemic had a profound effect on scientific practice. During this time, officials crucially relied on the work done by modellers. This raises novel questions for the philosophy of science. Here, I investigate the possibility of ‘natural models’ in predicting the virus’ trajectory for epidemiological purposes. I argue that to the extent that these can be consideredscientific models, they support the possibility of a continuum from scientific models to natural models differing in artifactual commitment. In making my case, I draw from work on model organisms and natural experiments as well as recent work in epidemiology.

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Modeling without Mathematics

Cited by 21 publications

References 9 publications

The New Fiction View of Models

The New Fiction View of Models

Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods

Motivating a Scientific Modeling Continuum: The Case of “Natural Models” in the COVID-19 Pandemic

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