Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report

Abadi, Martı́n; Blanchet, Bruno; Comon-Lundh, Hubert

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02658-4_5

Cited by 69 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…This work also has to be seen within the context of other applications of the fs2cv tool, including work on computationally sound mechanized proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos [20], as well as other work on computational soundness for formal security verification of crypto-protocols, such as [2,37,1,43,25]. General-purpose verifiers have also been applied to the related problem of verifying the code of cryptographic algorithms [9].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution

Aizatulin

Gordon

Jürjens

2012

Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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We verify cryptographic protocols coded in C for correspondence properties with respect to the computational model of cryptography. The first step uses symbolic execution to extract a process calculus model from a C implementation of the protocol. The new contribution is the second step in which we translate the extracted model to a CryptoVerif protocol description, such that successful verification with CryptoVerif implies the security of the original C implementation. We implement our method and apply it to verify several protocols out of reach of previous work in the symbolic model (using ProVerif), either due to the use of XOR and Diffie-Hellman commitments, or due to the lack of an appropriate computational soundness result. We analyse only a single execution path, so our tool is limited to code following a fixed protocol narration. This is the first security analysis of C code to target a verifier for the computational model. We successfully verify over 3000 LOC. One example (about 1000 LOC) is independently written and currently in testing phase for industrial deployment; during its analysis we uncovered a vulnerability now fixed by its author

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution

Aizatulin

Gordon

Jürjens

2012

Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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“…[39][40][41] Various cryptographic functions or relations, eg, signatures, encryption or decryption schemes, and one-way hash functions, are designed in ProVerif for evaluating their security. ProVerif being an automated tool is utilized hereby to validate the security strength of the proposed protocol.…”

Section: Formal Security Affirmation Through Proverifmentioning

confidence: 99%

An ameliorated two‐factor anonymous key exchange authentication protocol for mobile client‐server environment

Mahmood

Naqvi

Alzahrani

et al. 2018

Int J Communication

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Mobile communication is now an essential part of our day-to-day life due to expeditious progress in the industry of information technology. Prior to session key exchange with the corresponding server, a mobile user needs to be authenticated by that server in order to avail its services. Assorted authentication protocols are introduced so far, for authenticating the legitimate mobile users. Very recently, Lu et al introduced a two-factor scheme for key exchange in the mobile client-server environment. Lu et al declared that their introduced scheme is anonymous and robust for preventing potential attacks. However, we determined that the scheme of Lu et al is susceptible against server key reveal and smart card stolen attack. Moreover, it is also identified that their scheme is prone to traceability and anonymity violation attacks. Therefore, we proposed an improvement in order to increase the security and effectiveness. The immunity of the proposed protocol and correctness is tested, analyzed, and verified through formal proof of automated tool ProVerif and Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic, respectively. Moreover, the security and performance comparison also proved that the improved scheme is robust, efficient, and lightweight. KEYWORDS anonymity, authentication protocol, cryptanalysis, impersonation attack, key exchange, smart card stolen attack, traceability Int J Commun Syst. 2018;31:e3814.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dac

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“…40 Then, the security of the proposed scheme is proved using ProVerif, 41 which is a popular tool for automatic formal verification. First, the correctness of the proposed scheme is proved using Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic.…”

Section: Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

A secure authentication and key agreement scheme for roaming service with user anonymity

Arshad

Rasoolzadegan

2017

Int J Communication

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Nowadays, with the advancement of wireless technologies, global mobility networks offer roaming services for mobile users. Since in global mobility networks the communication channel is public, adversaries can launch different security attacks to breach the security and privacy of data and mobile users. Hence, an authentication and key agreement scheme can be used to provide secure roaming services. It is well known that the conventional authentication schemes are not suitable for global mobility networks, because the authentication server of each network has the credentials of its registered users and thus cannot verify the authenticity of the other mobile users. Hence, for providing secure roaming services, another type of authentication called roaming authentication is required. Hitherto, a large number of authentication protocols have been proposed for global mobility networks. However, most of them have been proved to be insecure against various attacks. This paper proposes a secure and efficient authentication and key agreement scheme for global mobility networks. The proposed scheme is based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem. The correctness of the proposed scheme is verified using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic.In addition, the security of the proposed scheme is proved using ProVerif. Detailed analyses demonstrate that the proposed scheme not only withstands various security attacks but also improves the efficiency by reducing the computational costs. KEYWORDS authentication, global mobility network (GLOMONET), key agreement, roaming service, security Int J Commun Syst. 2017;30:e3361.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/dac

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Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report

Abstract: Abstract. This paper discusses progress in the verification of security protocols. Focusing on a small, classic example, it stresses the use of program-like representations of protocols, and their automatic analysis in symbolic and computational models.

Cited by 69 publications

References 47 publications

Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution

Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution

An ameliorated two‐factor anonymous key exchange authentication protocol for mobile client‐server environment

A secure authentication and key agreement scheme for roaming service with user anonymity

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