Models of Imperfect Competition in Analysis of Siberian Electricity Market

Abstract

The paper considers mechanisms for organizing free trade in the electricity market that are based on submitting bids of energy consumers and producers to the market operator. The authors discuss and compare possible strategies of generator behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations and correspond to Cournot model and the models of supply function equilibria, and a perfectly competitive equilibrium. The mechanisms are tested on the basis of the Siberian electric power system.

Energy supply in the Khabarovsk territory: intra-regional differentiation and problems of budgetary support

“…There are two ways to regulate: introducing rules that determine the producers' behavior (conditions for entering the market and principles of pricing) or creating the conditions for stimulating the competition in the electricity and heat energy markets (removing barriers on entering, limiting concentration and vertical integration) [1][2][3]. There are many tools of state regulation as part of the first approach but they all pursue the same goal: protect the consumers (prices are as close to the marginal costs as possible and provide only normal gain for the producer), stimulate the efficiency [4,5].…”

The Simulation of Oligopoly Information Equilibria with Agents' Capacity Constraints

“…The result of the capacity constraints is manifested in the emergence of excessive demand, and the equilibrium depends on the strategy of the most competitive agent [19]. The capacity limitations were considered in models with linear [20]- [22] and quadratic [23], [24] functions of agents costs in the symmetric Coumot oligopoly. The asymmetric capacitylimited oligopoly was investigated in the presence of the Stackelberg leader [12], [25].…”