Moderating Diffusion: Military Bureaucratic Politics and the Implementation of German Doctrine in South America, 1885–1914

Abstract

How do military ideas, and military doctrines in particular, spread through the international system? This article extends extant work on military diffusion by exploring why some states, after deciding to adopt another's innovative warfighting system, fail to implement it. The author argues that for states to successfully implement a military doctrine developed abroad, much information about the unobservable aspects of the warfighting system is needed. States vary in their capacity to acquire the necessary knowledge because they face differing levels of resistance to military diffusion within their armed forces. Powerful groups within the military that are opposed to such adoptions are likely to use their influence to press for policies and bureaucratic maneuvers that constrain information flows between innovating states and their own state and consequently inhibit implementation and diffusion of military doctrines. Therefore successful implementation of foreign military doctrines can be expected when states face minimal resistance within their militaries, and moderated or failed implementation can be expected when opposition is more significant. A provisional test of the argument is conducted through an assessment of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile's attempts to implement the German military doctrine at the turn of the twentieth century.

The study of geography between 1885 and 1922: prussian roots of the Military Geographical Institute of Chile

“…Esto último se debe a que, como sostiene Grauer (2015), "el primer paso para reformar el Ejército de Chile era una revisión del sistema de educación de oficiales; sin líderes suficientemente capacitados dentro de las fuerzas, el Ejército no podía esperar llevar a cabo la compleja doctrina alemana" 20 .…”

What is a military innovation and why it matters

“…As a result, the U.S. military was ill prepared for the subsequent era of "small wars" from 1900 to 1940, which included a counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines and stability operation in Haiti. 38 Despite the Marine Corps' attempt at documenting lessons learned with the 1940 publication of the Small Wars Manual, a similar pattern emerged as U.S. efforts re-focused to World War II and the growing Soviet threat. The influence of the Manual was limited.…”

On Frontline Workers as Bureau-Political Actors: The Case of Civil–Military Crisis Management

“…Keane and Wood (2016), for instance, found that personnel in interorganizational Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan were primarily guided by their own agencies in their actions and pursued incongruent goals as a consequence. Some bureau-political authors recognize that there may be internal organizational dissent at times as well (see Grauer, 2015; O’Leary, 2010), but local bureaucrats are portrayed as relatively powerless and their active deviance is perceived as exceptional (Brower & Abolafia, 1997; O’Leary, 1994).…”