Moderation or radicalisation? How executive power affects right-wing populists’ satisfaction with democracy

Abstract

Moderation or radicalisation? How executive power affects right-wing populists' satisfaction with democracy This paper investigates if access to executive power strengthens or weakens the positive relationship found in previous research between dissatisfaction with democracy and electoral support for the populist right. Research on political trust and satisfaction with democracy thus far has almost exclusively focused on cases in which the populist right has been excluded from governing coalitions. Will access to executive power incite these parties to moderate their populist rhetoric and boost satisfaction among their supporters, or will limited policy impact and sustained populist messages even from within governments generate disappointment and therefore exacerbate dissatisfaction with the political system? This study investigates one of the few countries in Europe where a populist rightwing party has assumed national office, namely Norway. Using individual-level panel data I find support for the moderation perspective in that assuming office indeed weakens the relationship between dissatisfaction with democracy and electoral support for the populist right.

Rebuilding Trust in Broken Systems? Populist Party Success and Citizens’ Trust in Democratic Institutions

“…With previous contributions already finding a negative relationship between populism and political trust-voters of populist parties tend to be less trusting of the political system (Dahlberg & Linde, 2017;Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009) and low levels of political trust tend to further voting for populist parties (Doyle, 2011;Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011;Rooduijn, 2018;Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2012)-the recent rise of populism does not bode well for Europe's democracies. Yet, others have pointed out the potentially healing effect of populism: With new parties that challenge the establishment entering the political stage, citizens formerly disappointed by and disenchanted with politics may reconcile with the democratic system (Haugsgjerd, 2019;Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). This seems particularly likely in democracies which leave a lot to be desired in the eyes of citizens.…”

“…Yet the majority of them have focused on the impact populist parties have on actual policies and the quality of democracy, disregarding any effects on the attitudes of ordinary citizens. The only exception is a recent contribution by Haugsgjerd (2019), who demonstrates that supporters of the Norwegian radical-right populist Fremskrittspartiet have expressed increasing satisfaction with democracy after the party had gained executive power in 2013. Adding to both of these literatures, this article wants to contribute to our understanding of what the new realities of populism mean for Europe's democracies by examining how the electoral success of populist parties affects political trust in the general public and whether and how this effect varies across countries depending on democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance.…”

A tough trade-off? The asymmetrical impact of populist radical right inclusion on satisfaction with democracy and government

“…The fact that the net effect seems positive because the nativists' reaction is stronger than non-nativists' reaction, however, provocatively points to the conclusion that general SWD will increase if established parties continue their inclusive strategies towards PRR parties, at least in the short term. This is also suggested by a recent study on the effects of the inclusion of the Norwegian Progress Party in government after the 2013 election (Haugsgjerd, 2019).…”

“…This could help explain why there has been an increase in aggregate satisfaction with the way democracy works in countries after established parties have invited PRR parties as coalition partners. Empirical evidence of such an inclusion effect is scarce, but in a recent study of Norway, Haugsgjerd (2019) found that the gap in political support between Progress Party voters and mainstream party voters narrowed over time after the Progress Party joined a coalition government in 2013. This, in turn, might explain why sustained populist success has not been accompanied by a drastic decrease in satisfaction with democracy across Europe.…”

“…Our hypothesis would be confirmed if, net of this effect, nativists and non-nativists react differently to PRR inclusion. 2007, 2017-20192002, 2004, 2006 Danske folkeparti (DF) 2001(DF) -2011(DF) , 2015(DF) -2019(DF) 2002(DF) , 2004(DF) , 2006(DF) , 2008(DF) , 2010 Denmark The items were: It is good if society consists of people from different cultures; It is difficult for a foreigner to be accepted in the Netherlands while retaining his/her own culture; It should be made easier to obtain asylum in the Netherlands; Legally residing foreigners should be entitled to the same social security as Dutch citizens; There are too many people of foreign origin or descent in the Netherlands; People of foreign origin or descent are not accepted in the Netherlands; Some sectors of the economy can only continue to function because people of foreign origin or descent work there; It does not help a neighbourhood if there are many people of foreign origin or descent.…”