Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, Postdemokratie

Rippl, Susanne; Seipel, Christian

doi:10.1007/s11577-018-0522-1

Cited by 78 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Feeling less well off than one deserves creates discontent. The notion of such discontent being important for populist support ties in with many reports of populism and its success in the last decades ranging from Taggart’s (2004) concept of the “sense of crisis” to the “losers of modernization” thesis (Kriesi et al, 2006; Lengfeld, 2017b; Rippl and Seipel, 2018; Rooduijn, 2015) and arguments regarding democratic disappointments (Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005).…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support

et al. 2020

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Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one’s personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.

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mentioning

confidence: 95%

Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support

et al. 2020

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“…Auch mit der PEGIDA-Bewegung als außerparlamentarische Sammelbewegung haben sich einige Vertreter aus den Reihen der Demokratie-und Protest-sowie der Migrationsforschung beschäftigt (Rucht et al 2015;Geiges et al 2015;Schammann 2015;Decker 2015). Relativ viel Interesse hat auch die Nachfrageseite des politischen Markts und damit besonders das Wählerklientel der AfD erfahren (Lengfeld und Dilger 2018;Schmitt-Beck et al 2017;Hambacher und Mays 2018;Decker 2016;Rippl und Seipel 2018).…”

Section: Aktueller Forschungsstandunclassified

What Determines Attitudes Toward the Consequences of the Reception of Refugees in Germany? Results from the GESIS Panel 2016

Reinhardt

Frings

2020

Polit Vierteljahresschr

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ZusammenfassungDie sogenannte Flüchtlingskrise ist eines der dominierenden Themen in Westeuropa und steht im Zusammenhang mit zunehmend erfolgreichen rechtspopulistischen Parteien und Bewegungen. Die deutsche Gesellschaft scheint gespalten zu sein in der Frage, ob die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen für Deutschland mehr Chancen oder mehr Risiken mit sich bringt. Dieser Artikel analysiert die Frage nach den Gründen für eine optimistische bzw. pessimistische Sicht auf die Folgen der Flüchtlingsaufnahme. Anknüpfend an drei zentrale Erklärungsansätze der vergleichenden Forschung zu immigrationsbezogenen Einstellungen testen wir den Einfluss von sozioökonomischen Determinanten, kulturellen Determinanten (Ethnozentrismus und soziales Vertrauen) sowie von Kontakt mit Flüchtlingen. Datengrundlage bildet das GESIS-Panel 2016. Soziales Vertrauen, Ethnozentrismus und Kontakt erweisen sich als erklärungskräftige Determinanten. Insbesondere Ethnozentrismus hat einen starken Effekt auf die Einstellungen zu den Konsequenzen der Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in Deutschland. Soziales Vertrauen wirkt offenbar weniger direkt, sondern eher indirekt, vermittelt über Ethnozentrismus.

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“…AfD voters show a number of characteristics. They perceive themselves as socio-economically deprived (Tutic and von Hermanni 2018), show a low trust in democracy and the current government (Ripple and Seipel 2018), and/or have illiberal, right-wing ideas (Lengfeld 2018). They are above-the-average male, living in the new federal states, and often older people living in the countryside (Franz, Fratzscher, and Kritikos 2018).…”

Section: Explaining Support For Right-wing Populism In Poland and Germentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Socio-cultural explanations focus on the loss of the "pride" and recognition of the "little man on the street" who mourns the loss of traditional cultural norms, especially gender ones (Sauer 2018), as well as a continuity of authoritarian character in German society (Heitmeyer 2018) and, in particular, a fear of immigration (Lengfeld 2018). The socio-political explanations are less prominent at the moment in the German debate (Ripple and Seipel 2018).…”

Section: Explaining Support For Right-wing Populism In Poland and Germentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Is a Right-Wing Supporter? On the Biographical Experiences of Young Right-Wing Voters in Poland and Germany

Mrozowicki

Trappmann²,

Seehaus

et al. 2019

QSR

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This article explores the selected cases of the biographies of right-wing supporters from a larger sample of narrative interviews with young (18-35 years old) people in Poland and Germany. In the existing literature, we can find the socio-economic explanations of the sources of the right-wing turn (related to economic deprivation, precarisation, social exclusion, labor market competition with immigrants and others), as well as cultural explanations connected with new identity politics, symbolic exclusion and divide between society and political elites, the disembedding from previously solid communities, and the fear of new risks related to the inflow of cultural Others. Despite notable exceptions, it is rather uncommon to discuss in this context the actual biographical experiences of right-wing and far-right supporters. In the article, we take a closer look at four biographical cases of people declaring their political support for far right parties. The analysis of the cases leads to the distinction of socio-economic and socio-political pathways to right-wing populist support.

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Modernisierungsverlierer, Cultural Backlash, Postdemokratie

Cited by 78 publications

References 6 publications

Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support

Discontent With What? Linking Self-Centered and Society-Centered Discontent to Populist Party Support

What Determines Attitudes Toward the Consequences of the Reception of Refugees in Germany? Results from the GESIS Panel 2016

Who Is a Right-Wing Supporter? On the Biographical Experiences of Young Right-Wing Voters in Poland and Germany

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