Modernization Losers’ Revenge? Income Mobility and Support for Right- and Left-Wing Populist Parties in Germany

Abstract

Against the backdrop of rising support for right- and left-wing populist parties in Europe, a long-standing argument has been that the more vulnerable strata of society are deprived by structural economic change as well as increasing social inequality and express their grievances by voting for radical and populist parties. Previous research has tested the thesis either based on cross-sectional data and vague proxies for past income developments or used objective short-term measures of income changes. In this study, we propose a more thorough test using longitudinal data and measures of objective relative deprivation, objective absolute deprivation, and subjective deprivation. Using SOEP data for 2016, our results show little support that those with lower incomes identify more with the populist right-wing AfD in Germany. Furthermore, we find no evidence that objectively falling behind is associated with more support for the AfD and the populist left-wing party die Linke among the less well off. Rather, support for the AfD is highest among the less well-off with stable incomes and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been unstable. For die Linke, support is highest among the less well-off who experienced absolute income gains and the less well-off who perceive their incomes as having been upwardly or downwardly mobile.

Income Change, Gender, and Attitudes Towards Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Netherlands

“…However, consistent with our hypothesis, regarding the moderating effect of gender, we find that for men alone, personal income change is causally and negatively related to attitudes towards RWP parties. Furthermore, in contrast to the findings of Hartmann et al (2022), we do find a causal and negative link between household income and attitudes towards RWP parties. However, regarding household income, we find no difference between the genders.…”

“…While in Southern Europe globalization takes the form of direct economic and political interventions by global organizations or corporations, such as the ECB and the IMF, in Northern Europe it takes the form of growing number of immigrants who are perceived to compete against "the people" for fewer industrial jobs and contracting welfare support (Rodrik, 2018). Researchers thus focused on the losers of globalization as a major cause in the surge of populist support (Hartmann et al, 2022;Hobolt, 2016b;Kriesi et al, 2006), the numbers of which were increased by the global Great Recession of 2008 (Colantone and Stanig, 2019;Gidron and Mijs, 2019;Margalit, 2019).…”

“…As far as we know, only the works of Gidron and Mijs (2019) and Hartmann et al (2022) investigated longitudinally the influence of income decline on support of right-wing populism. As noted by Hartmann et al (2022), in this longitudinal analysis we must separate between two distinct types of income decline: absolute and relative. While an absolute decline is a decline that relative to one's own income previously, a relative decline is a decline in one's standing relative to others.…”

“…An increase of one thousand Euro to someone who has nothing is more significant compared to an additional thousand Euro to a millionaire. Hartmann et al (2022), building upon Gidron and Mijs (2019), tests for the effect of both absolute and relative income decline and increase in Germany. They find that income decline, both absolute and relative, does not lead to support of RWP parties.…”

“…Income change is a possible way of measuring being economically "left behind". However, as far as we know, only two contributions (Gidron and Mijs, 2019;Hartmann et al, 2022) have attempted to objectivity test the effect of income change on support of RWP parties using longitudinal data. Surprisingly, they find only scarce evidence that suggests income change leads to change in level of support of right-wing populism.…”