Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

Abstract

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

Framed Experiments and Games in Agriculture: A Systematic Review of the 21st Century in Economics and Social Science

“…Finally, social preference games suggest that: familiarity with neighbors leads to more prosocial behavior; social trust influences technology adoption; trust influences farmers' willingness to participate in potentially risky social actions; and scarcity is not always an explanation for anti-social behavior. [13] finds that members of larger farming communities were less willing to contribute to a public goods game.…”

How Access to Irrigation Influences Poverty and Livelihoods: A Case Study from Sri Lanka

“…Data for this analysis was gathered from a series of surveys that we have carried out in this area from the year 2000. An initial evaluation study was commissioned between 2000 and 2002 to assess the impact of irrigation infrastructure on poverty alleviation (Hussain et al 2002;Sawada et al 2010;Sawada et al 2012;Shoji et al 2012). In 2005, a section of the project coverage area; i.e.…”

Incentive for risk sharing and trust formation: experimental and survey evidence from Bangladesh

“…Interpersonal trust is an essential element of socioeconomic development, particularly in developing countries. In rural communities, members often engage in cooperative behaviour such as irrigation maintenance and credit transactions without a contract enforcement institution (Bardhan, 2000;Bouma et al, 2008;Hayami, 2009;Karlan, et al 2009;Sawada et al 2013). Therefore, trust between community members-namely particularized trust-plays an important role.…”