Modularity and mental architecture

Robbins, Philip

doi:10.1002/wcs.1255

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Furthermore, evolutionary psychological hypotheses turn on inferences about hypothetical cognitive structures-the mental modules-for which there is a dearth of empirical support (see, for example, Samuels 1998Samuels , 2000Buller and Hardcastle 2000;Currie and Sterelny 2000;Fodor 2000;Sterelny 2003;Buller 2005;Prinz 2006;Schultz 2008;Robbins 2009Robbins , 2013Heyes 2014), and there is no evidence that the minds of our prehistoric ancestors possessed this sort of cognitive architecture.…”

Section: Contrasting Evolutionary Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?

Smith

2019

Biol Theory

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In this article I argue that evolutionary psychological strategies for making inferences about present-day human psychology are methodologically unsound. Evolutionary psychology is committed to the view that the mind has an architecture that has been conserved since the Pleistocene, and that our psychology can be fruitfully understood in terms of the original, fitnessenhancing functions of these conserved psychological mechanisms. But for evolutionary psychological explanations to succeed, practitioners must be able to show that contemporary cognitive mechanisms correspond to those that were selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, that these present-day cognitive mechanisms are descended from the corresponding ancestral mechanisms, and that they have retained the functions of the ancestral mechanisms from which they are descended. I refer to the problem of demonstrating that these conditions obtain as "the matching problem," argue that evolutionary psychology does not have the resources to address it, and conclude that evolutionary psychology, as it is currently understood, is therefore impossible.

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Section: Contrasting Evolutionary Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?

Smith

2019

Biol Theory

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“…Cairns-Smith’s (2005) claim of universality is significant because much evolutionary psychology research focuses on identifying universal or species-typical features of human nature (Buss, 1991)—faculties that were so useful when they first appeared, such as language, that now, every human being has them, with little or no individual variation (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). According to the “massive modularity” school of evolutionary thought, evolved cognitive mechanisms are likely to be very numerous and specific in scope, rather than few and general in scope (Robbins, 2013). An example of a specific mechanism is the famous “cheater-detection” module, said to notify people that they are being exploited within an exchange relationship (Cosmides, 1989).…”

Section: Extant Evolutionary Theorizing Concerning Fwmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Spurrett (2016) discussed the tension in the field between proposed evolved decision-making architectures that are domain-specific in scope versus decision architectures that are more general-purpose. His argument for FW emphasized the efficiency of an evolved general-purpose decision-making mechanism that can address emerging problems of many types, no matter what their specific content or nature (see also Robbins, 2013; F. M. Toates, 2020).…”

Section: Extant Evolutionary Theorizing Concerning Fwmentioning

confidence: 99%

The free will capacity: A uniquely human adaption.

Sheldon

2024

American Psychologist

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Herein, I characterize free will (FW) is an evolved functional capacity within the mature human mind, which provides us with numerous adaptive benefits. The FW capacity was selected for because it enables us to respond effectively to momentary contingencies, via on-the-spot deliberation. But FW also extricates us from the present moment, enabling us to generate and decide between imagined long-term futures. Based upon a compatibilist philosophical definition of FW, I present a creative process model of how the FW capacity works, the goal breakthrough model. I show that the goal breakthrough model is consistent with extant neuroscientific research on the brain networks involved in creative cognition and choice. I also show that (a) exercising one's FW is a basic psychological need, as evidenced by the fact that thwarting peoples' autonomy can be harmful, and that (b) the FW process is influenced by peoples' broad goals and narrative identities, providing a way for we conscious people to causally affect our lives and the world. Finally, I show how this framework integrates recent arguments that FW may be a uniquely human adaptation, ranging from neuroscience and cognitive to personality, social, and cultural perspectives.

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“…Similarly, mentalists could-but do not-argue that there is a compelling body of evidence that, as claimed by evolutionary psychologists, complex cognitive processes tend to be domain-specific rather than domain-general. Any argument of this kind is unlikely to be convincing given widespread concern about the empirical bases and conceptual coherence of evolutionary psychology's version of the modularity of mind thesis (Pietraszewski & Wertz, 2022;Robbins, 2013).…”

Section: Model Complexity > Cognitive Complexity > Social Specificitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Social learning in models and minds

Yon,

Heyes

2024

Synthese

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After more than a century in which social learning was blackboxed by evolutionary biologists, psychologists and economists, there is now a thriving industry in cognitive neuroscience producing computational models of learning from and about other agents. This is a hugely positive development. The tools of computational cognitive neuroscience are rigorous and precise. They have the potential to prise open the black box. However, we argue that, from the perspective of a scientific realist, these tools are not yet being applied in an optimal way. To fulfil their potential, the shiny new methods of cognitive neuroscience need to be better coordinated with old-fashioned, contrastive experimental designs. Inferences from model complexity to cognitive complexity, of the kind made by those who favour lean interpretations of behaviour (‘associationists’), require social learning to be tested in challenging task environments. Inferences from cognitive complexity to social specificity, made by those who favour rich interpretations (‘mentalists’), call for non-social control experiments. A parsimonious model that fits current data is a good start, but carefully designed experiments are needed to distinguish models that tell us how social learning could be done from those that tell us how it is really done.

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Modularity and mental architecture

Cited by 8 publications

References 46 publications

Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?

Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?

The free will capacity: A uniquely human adaption.

Social learning in models and minds

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