Modulating proactive cognitive control by reward: differential anticipatory effects of performance-contingent and non-contingent rewards

Abstract

The present study investigated the influences of two different forms of reward presentation in modulating cognitive control. In three experiments, participants performed a flanker task for which one-third of trials were precued for a chance of obtaining a reward (reward trials). In Experiment 1, a reward was provided if participants made the correct response on reward trials, but a penalty was given if they made an incorrect response on these trials. The anticipation of this performance-contingent reward increased response speed and reduced the flanker effect, but had little influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials. In Experiment 2, participants obtained a reward randomly on two-thirds of the precued reward trials and were given a penalty on the remaining one-third, regardless of their performance. The anticipation of this non-contingent reward had little influence on the overall response speed or flanker effect, but reduced the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials. Experiment 3 also used performance non-contingent rewards, but participants were randomly penalized more often than they were rewarded; non-contingent penalty had little influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect. None of the three experiments showed a reliable influence of the actual acquisition of rewards on task performance. These results indicate anticipatory effects of performance-contingent and non-contingent rewards on cognitive control with little evidence of aftereffects.

A meta-analytic investigation of the role of reward on inhibitory control

“…In this case, the effect of rewards did not influence the inhibition performance (see similar findings in Michałowski et al, 2017;Paschke et al, 2015;Schevernels et al, 2015;and Shanahan et al, 2008). Furthermore, some studies have reported the presence of reward being detrimental to IC (Marini et al, 2015;Williams et al, 2018;Yamaguchi & Nishimura, 2019), possibly due to a break in attentional focus caused by reward stimuli (Wang et al, 2018). Finally, studies have examined whether the presence or magnitude of reward interacts with clinical diagnoses (e.g., attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD], substance use disorder [SUD]); however, these effects are also equivocal (Charles-Walsh et al, 2016;Chung et al, 2011;Rosell-Negre et al, 2016).…”

The face of control: Corrugator supercilii tracks aversive conflict signals in the service of adaptive cognitive control

“…Relatedly, inhibition of a dominant response tendency can also trigger stimulus devaluation (Wessel, O’Doherty, Berkebeile, Lindemann, & Aron, ), which corroborates a tight relationship between the evaluative and cognitive control processes. Furthermore, studies have shown that affective stimuli can modulate conflict adaptation, providing further evidence for a functional role of affect for control (Kuhbandner & Zehetleitner, ; Schuch & Koch, ; Schuch, Zweerings, Hirsch, & Koch, ; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, , , ; but see Dignath, Janczyk, & Eder, ; Yamaguchi & Nishimura, , Exp. 2 & 3).…”

Reward elicits cognitive control over emotional distraction: Evidence from pupillometry

“…A central tenet of the DMC framework is that we shift to more effective, but more effortful, proactive control only when it is worthwhile to do so (see Botvinick & Braver, 2015, for a review). Reward is one incentive that is known to motivate a shift to proactive control in emotionally neutral contexts (Chiew & Braver, 2013Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014Hefer & Dreisbach, 2016;Locke & Braver, 2008;Padmala & Pessoa, 2011;Yamaguchi & Nishimura, 2018). This proactive shift is thought to be implemented via connections between reward-processing areas (such as the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex) and cognitive control regions (such as the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Botvinick & Braver, 2015;Pessoa, 2009;Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010).…”