Monetary Policy and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Economies (NK-Default)

Abstract

This paper develops a New Keynesian model with sovereign debt and default. We focus on domestic interest rules governing monetary policy and external foreign currency government debt that is defaultable. Monetary policy and default risk interact as they both impact domestic consumption and production. We find that default risk generates monetary frictions, which amplify the monetary response to shocks. Large sovereign default risk depresses domestic consumption and production. These monetary frictions in turn discipline sovereign borrowing, resulting in slower debt accumulation and lower spreads. Our framework replicates the positive co-movements of sovereign spreads with domestic nominal rates and inflation, a salient feature of emerging markets data, and can rationalize the experience of Brazil during the 2015 downturn, with high inflation, nominal rates, and sovereign spreads. A counterfactual experiment shows that, by raising the domestic rate, the Brazilian central bank not only reduced inflation but also alleviated the debt crisis. * We thank our discussants Giancarlo Corsetti, Radek Paluszynski, and Vivian Yue for insightful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Contact

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