Money-Back Guarantee, Dual Money-Back Guarantee, and O2O Strategy in a Manufacturer’s Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Liu, Jiqiong; Ren, Minglun; Yang, Anli; Feng, Shuai

doi:10.1155/2020/1697082

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Most competition between online and offline channels is focused on pricing decisions. Most researchers believe that in a competitive environment, the sales prices in the two channels would be different [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29]. Some researchers have contended that physical sales prices tend to be higher than online sales prices because of the former's higher operating costs [26,27].…”

Section: Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperate or Not? A Service Cooperation Strategy for Products With Service Attributes Considering Showrooming Behavior

Liu,

Feng

2023

IEEE Access

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In the face of competitive pricing pressure from online retailers and high-quality service pressure from physical retailers, are retailers in these two channels willing to establish a service cooperation (SC) strategy? If so, then will they support or avoid consumer showrooming behavior? To address these questions, we use a game theoretic model to examine three strategic configurations: nonservice cooperation (SN), SC, and nonshowroom cooperation (NC). We recommend the optimal strategy based on factors influencing the servicelevel threshold, such as market information coverage factors and service characteristics. Our results show that the SC strategy is the best for physical retailers when their market coverage is low or the threshold requirement for service is high; however, when the service level is low, physical retailers should avoid supporting consumer showrooming behavior; that is, the NC strategy is their best choice. In contrast, online retailers are always willing to choose the SC strategy and support showrooming to reflect their lower price advantage. Finally, we explore the optimal strategies of the two retailers in the endogenous service-level scenario. The optimal strategy selection of online retailers remains unchanged. However, physical retailers prefer the SN strategy because of their dominance in service; these retailers have the incentive to choose the NC strategy when their markets have a high degree of information coverage.

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Section: Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperate or Not? A Service Cooperation Strategy for Products With Service Attributes Considering Showrooming Behavior

Liu,

Feng

2023

IEEE Access

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“…Our focus is how to weaken the negative effects of competition in this process while simultaneously strengthening its positive impact to benefit from it. In this vein, numerous channel cooperation and coordination mechanisms aimed at alleviating various competitions and conflicts have been developed, including cooperative pricing [18,19,31,32], service cooperation [23,33], and other coordination strategies [16,17,34]. Dumrongsiri et al [18] studied the equilibrium conditions of the market shares of the manufacturer and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain and showed that the marginal cost difference between the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual-channel equilibrium.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complementary Product Pricing and Service Cooperation Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Ren

Liu

Feng³

et al. 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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This paper investigates a pricing game and service cooperation for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain composed of two manufacturers and one retailer. The products of the two manufacturers are complementary products. One manufacturer sells products simultaneously through its own online channel and the traditional retailer, and the manufacturer delivers the product’s service to the retailer in its network direct sales channel by cooperating with the retailer in the form of service cost sharing. Considering the different market power structures of channel members, we establish three different pricing game models. By using the backward induction method and game theory, we obtain the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions. Then, the service cooperation strategy of using the channel service sensitivity coefficients to construct the weight to share the service cost is proposed. Finally, numerical examples of optimal pricing strategies and profit conditions in different game situations are given, and sensitivity analysis of some key parameters is selectively performed, in which some valuable management insights are obtained.

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“…Most studies on refund policies have been carried out in the context of a single-retailer setting [2,23,37] or a two-retailer setting [8,29,30] and mainly focused on fullrefund, partial-refund, and no-refund policies. A few scholars have also studied consumer refund policies in the manufacturer-retailer dual-channel supply chain [79]. e single retailer mentioned here mainly refers to a retailer in a single-channel context (an offline physical retailer or an online retailer).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Return Mode Selection and Pricing Strategy for a Dual-Channel Retailer

Feng

Liu

et al. 2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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With the rapid development of e-commerce and the economy, an increasing number of retailers are adopting a dual-channel retail strategy (DCRS), which allows customers to return unsatisfactory products, provided that their complaints are reasonable, and receive a full refund. This paper studies the pricing strategies of an integrated dual-channel retailer (DCR) when it provides return policies to customers, including original channel return, fixed cross-channel return, and relaxed cross-channel return. The relationship between the DCR’s system performance and channel pricing is impacted by customer channel preferences, and the return rates of different channels are discussed. The results show that the greater the difference in customer preferences between channels is, the greater the profitability of the DCR will be. A fixed cross-channel return model should be selected when the return rate in the online channel is higher or the cross-channel return rate is lower; otherwise, the original channel return model should be selected. When the return rate of a certain channel is high, the retailer should increase the price in that channel and reduce the pricing of its competing channel to compensate for the loss caused by the returns and transfer sales between channels. A selective return policy can not only improve the flexibility of business operations and enhance competitive advantage but also provide convenient customer returns and enhance consumers’ sense of security.

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Money-Back Guarantee, Dual Money-Back Guarantee, and O2O Strategy in a Manufacturer’s Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Cited by 5 publications

References 42 publications

Cooperate or Not? A Service Cooperation Strategy for Products With Service Attributes Considering Showrooming Behavior

Cooperate or Not? A Service Cooperation Strategy for Products With Service Attributes Considering Showrooming Behavior

Complementary Product Pricing and Service Cooperation Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Return Mode Selection and Pricing Strategy for a Dual-Channel Retailer

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